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ARTICLES
BA TSON" S APPELLATE APPEAL AND TRIAL
TRIBULATIONS
Jonathan Abel*
Batson v. Kentucky is widely regarded as a failure. In the thirty-
plus years since it was decided by the Supreme Court, the doctrine has
been subjected to unrelenting criticism for its inability to stop the dis-
criminatoy use of peremptory challenges. The scholarly literature is
nearly unanimous: Batson is broken. But this Article approaches
Batson from a different perspective, focusing on Batson's appellate
virtues rather than its trial shortcomings. This change in focus reveals
a number of ways in which the Batson doctrine provides opportunities
on appeal that do not exist at trial. In short, this Article argues that
appellate Batson punches far above its trial weight.
Batson's appellate virtues have been overlooked by the literature,
and this Article's first task is to illustrate them. This Article's second
project is to reorient the discussion about Batson by placing the doctrine
in the proper context. In comparison to other antidiscrimination claims-
and to other postconviction claims, more broadly-Batson has a real
luster. Though not often acknowledged as such, Batson is the one
meaningful doctrine for fighting discrimination in the jury-selection
process and in the criminal justice system more generally. Enormous
pressure is put on Batson as a result, and maybe Batson is not up to
the task. But with Batson's appellate dimension, the doctrine is more
up to the task than previously thought. This Article's final goal, in light
of Batson's appellate virtues, is to suggest a reconceptualization of
Batson as not merely a jury-selection doctrine but rather a multi-
purpose vehicle capable offighting discrimination wherever it occurs in
the trial process-even if the discrimination takes place outside of jury
selection. For appellate judges who want to correct the injustice of a
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trial stained by discrimination, a broad-based Batson doctrine may be
their best, last, and only hope.
INTRO DU CTIO N ......................................................................................... 714
1. BATSoiVs CRITIQUES AND BATSON'S PROPER CONTEXT ...................... 716
A . Batson's Practical Failings ............................................................ 716
B . B atson's O ddities ......................................................................... 723
C. Batson's Antidiscrimination Comparators .................................. 726
1. Swain v. A labam a ................................................................... 726
2. Fair C ross-Section ................................................................. 727
3. H am and R istaino .................................................................. 729
II. BATSONfS APPELLATE-TRIAL DIDE ................................................... 733
A. Difference in Remedy Between Trial and Appellate-Habeas
L itigatio n ..................................................................................... 734
B. Difference in Evidence Between Trial and Post-Trial
P roceedin gs ................................................................................. 737
1. Jury-Selection N otes .............................................................. 738
2. The Prosecutor's Behavior in Other Cases and Outside
of C ou rt ................................................................................. 741
3. Policies, Trainings, and Internal Memos ............................. 745
4. Comparative Juror Analysis .................................................. 747
5. Batson Reconstruction Hearings .......................................... 749
C. Difference in Judicial Approach to Trial and Appeal ............... 752
III. IM PLICATIO N S ..................................................................................... 755
A. Batson as a Multipurpose Vehicle to Combat Discrimination ... 755
B. Appellate Batson's Symbolism, Rhetoric, and Power ................. 757
C. The Gap Between the Trial and Appellate Doctrine Is a Feature,
N ot a Flaw , of Batson ................................................................... 762
1. Evidence: Leveling Up and Leveling Down ........................ 762
2. Remedy: Leveling Up and Leveling Down .......................... 764
3. Broader Reflections on the Trial-Post-Trial Gaps .............. 765
C O N CLU SIO N ............................................................................................. 767
INTRODUCTION
Batson v. Kentucky1 is well known, much condemned, but misunder-
stood. Academic and judicial commentators emphasize Batson's short-
1. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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comings.2 They say it fails to stop peremptory strikes that are motivated
by race, gender, and other prohibited characteristics.3 Despite its promise,
Batson permits anyone who is so inclined to make prejudicial peremptory
strikes, so long as the striker takes a few perfunctory steps to conceal her
intent, or so the argument goes.4 A chorus of voices has asserted that dis-
criminatory jury selection is every bit as problematic today as it was at
Batson's inception back in 1986,5 and that the only option left for pre-
venting the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes, now that Batson has
struck out, is to ban peremptories altogether.
6
This Article comes at Batson from a different direction. It acknowl-
edges Batson's failings as a trial doctrine-its inability to prevent and
remedy strikes in real time-but shifts the focus to Batson's virtues in
appellate and postconviction proceedings. Rather than dismissing Batson
as an abject failure, this Article compares it to other equal protection and
antidiscrimination claims that litigants use in their post-trial litigation.
This shift in focus is part of the process of resuscitating Batson's reputa-
tion. Indeed, too little attention has been given to how Batson operates
post-trial, when it is the lone meaningful doctrine for fighting discrimina-
tion in the justice system-the only doctrine defendants can plead and
actually win.7
As the lone meaningful antidiscrimination doctrine, Batson has been
placed under the pressure of enormous expectations, and the doctrine
admittedly may not be up to the task. But Batson may be more up for the
challenge than previously thought, especially if the focus shifts from
Batson's trial failings to its post-trial potential. This Article argues for a re-
evaluation of Batson in light of the fundamental divergence between trial
and appellate Batson. It argues that there is great potential for the latter,
not only as a doctrine that fights discriminatory peremptory strikes but as
a multipurpose vehicle for attacking all forms of discrimination that man-
ifest themselves at trial. Batson is a rare invitation for judges-especially
appellate judges-to denounce structural discrimination, and unlike
other doctrines, Batson's automatic-reversal remedy allows judges to at-
tach consequences to their words.'
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the substantial
literature criticizing Batson and discusses why Batson is such a surprising
standard-bearer of antidiscrimination law. Part II illustrates several signif-
icant ways that post-trial Batson claims provide opportunities for litigants
2. See infra section I.A.
3. See infra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 270 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)
("On the other hand, the use of race- and gender-based stereotypes in the jury-selection
process seems better organized and more systematized than ever before.").
6. See infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
7. See infra section I.C.
8. See infra section II.A.
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that were not available at trial. These include a remedy, post-trial, that
elevates the value of a Batson win beyond what it would have been at trial.
They also include the increased ability to bring in extra-record evidence
that was not, and could not have been, available at trial. In addition, Part
II identifies idiosyncrasies of Batson's pleading structure that make it well
suited to survive in the difficult habeas landscape.
Part III discusses the implications of the trial-post-trial divide within
the Batson doctrine. Batson should bear more weight in the fight against
discrimination by incorporating into the Batson claim any evidence of the
prosecutor's racism at trial--even evidence from proceedings outside of
jury selection. That is the first implication of recognizing post-trial Batson's
unique virtues. Second, this Part notes how Batson presents fundamen-
tally different issues to appellate judges than to trial judges. For appellate
judges, Batson is the rare opportunity to declaim on structural issues of
racism, democracy, and civics-an opportunity that trial judges do not
have or want. Finally, Part III argues that the gap between trial and post-
trial Batson cannot be closed without undermining key tenets of the
doctrine. The divergence, as uncomfortable as it makes people, is built
into the doctrine.
Batson appeals are extremely hard to win. There is no denying that.
But for all of Batson's failings, it is still the strongest antidiscrimination
doctrine available to litigants, and it provides a unique opportunity for
appellate judges to take aim at all manner of discrimination that may
have taken place at trial, even outside of the voir dire process.
I. BA TSON' S CRITIQUES AND BA TSON' S PROPER CONTEXT
A. Batson's Practical Failings
In 1986, when the Supreme Court decided Batson v. Kentucky, the an-
nounced goal was to end the race-based use of peremptory strikes.9 The
aims of the doctrine could not have been higher.'0 Batson was the Court's
official acknowledgement that discrimination in jury selection was an
assault on defendant, juror, and justice alike." From the beginning,
though, Batson was received with skepticism by those most intent on
eliminating discrimination. In his Batson concurrence, Justice Thurgood
Marshall predicted that the decision "will not end the racial discrimi-
nation that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That goal
can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges
9. 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (describing the foundation of "the Court's unceasing
efforts to eradicate racial discrimination in the procedures used to select" jurors).
10. See Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory
Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 808, 835
(1989) (explaining the Court's hope that Batson would "work to bring us closer to our
ideal" that "race is irrelevant").
11. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86-87.
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entirely. ' 12 And, in the three decades since, Justice Marshall's assessment
has echoed through judicial opinions and academic articles to the point
that it is considered a mainstream view of Batson.1
3
Batson is a great disappointment, if not an outright failure, accord-
ing to many thoughtful critiques. The doctrine is "toothless"14 and a
"charade";15 "impotent in preventing discrimination";6 blind to "the in-
equities that flow from racial- and gender-based iscrimination";'7 "'almost
surely a failure' and an 'enforcement nightmare.""' 8 To Justice Stephen
Breyer, "the use of race- and gender-based stereotypes in the jury-selec-
tion process seems better organized and more systematized than ever
12. Id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring).
13. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 267 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)
("Today's case reinforces Justice Marshall's concerns."); Crittenden v. Chappell, 804 F.3d
998, 1020 (9th Cir. 2015) (McKeown,J., dissenting) ("Justice Marshall was prescient in his
concurrence in Batson...."); Morgan v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 99, 115-16 (Ky.
2006) (Graves, J., concurring) (discussing Justice Marshall's Batson concurrence and
expressing "hope [that this decision] may be one step closer to the inevitable implosion of
the current peremptory challenge system"), overruled by Shane v. Commonwealth, 243
S.W.3d 335 (Ky. 2006); People v. Brown, 769 N.E.2d 1266, 1272 (N.Y. 2002) (Kaye, CJ.,
concurring) ("My own years on this extraordinary Court, dealing with countless Batson
challenges, have brought me far closer to the perception of Justice Thurgood
Marshall .. "); Nancy S. Marder, Batson v. Kentucky. Reflections Inspired by a Podcast,
105 Ky. LJ. 621, 626 (2017).
14. Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutors and Peremptories, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 1467, 1469
(2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson
Doctrine: The Supreme Court's Utter Failure to Meet the Challenge of Discrimination in
Jury Selection, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 501, 501).
15. Minetos v. CUNY, 925 F. Supp. 177, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
16. CharlesJ. Ogletree,Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory
Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1099, 1105 (1994); see also Camille
A. Nelson, Batson, O.J., and Snyder. Lessons from an Intersecting Trilogy, 93 Iowa L. Rev.
1687, 1689 (2008) ("[T]he original goals articulated twenty years ago in Batson remain
unfulfilled. Batson's promise of protection against racially discriminatory jury selection has
not been realized.").
17. Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, The Changing Face of Jury Selection: Batson and Its
Practical Implications, 56 La. BJ. 408, 409 (2009).
18. Joshua Revesz, Comment, Ideological Imbalance and the Peremptory Challenge,
125 Yale L.J. 2535, 2535 (2016) (first quoting Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What
We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447,
503 (1996); and then quoting William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but
Killing the Patient, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 97, 134); see also Note, Judging the Prosecution:
Why Abolishing Peremptory Challenges Limits the Dangers of Prosecutorial Discretion,
119 Harv. L. Rev. 2121, 2134 (2006) ("Although the Supreme Court has expanded Batson's




before."19 The criticism of Batson is so persistent that it seems everyone
who writes about the doctrine must emphasize its failings.
20
Against this bleak backdrop of Batson scholarship, this Article pre-
sents a more positive account-an account informed by observing liti-
gators' relative enthusiasm for other antidiscrimination doctrines. Before
presenting this positive account of Batson, however, it is important to lay
out some of the most important critiques of Batson for the reader.
One important complaint about Batson is the ease with which
Batson's prohibitions are evaded.21 Batson intended to provide litigants
with a mechanism to prevent, identify, and disallow discriminatory per-
emptory strikes. It established a three-step, burden-shifting framework
borrowed from employment discrimination.22 At step one of Batson, the
person challenging the peremptory strike must make a prima facie show-
ing that the strike was motivated by the juror's race, gender, or other
protected characteristic.2 If there is an inference of discrimination, the
19. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 270 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); see also
State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 334 (Wash. 2013) ("Twenty-six years later it is evident that
Batson, like Swain before it, is failing us.").
20. See, e.g., Theodore McMillian & Christopher J. Petrini, Batson v. Kentucky. A
Promise Unfulfilled, 58 UMKC L. Rev. 361, 369 (1990) (discussing the "extremely difficult
time" courts have had in applying Batson). Professor Russell Covey identified a number of
articles and books criticizing Batson, including: David Cole, No Equal Justice 120 (1999);
Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges,
and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 153, 209 (1989); Lonnie T. Brown, Jr.,
Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: Professional Misconduct, Not Legitimate Advocacy,
22 Rev. Litig. 209, 213 n.16 (2003); and Daniel M. Hinkle, Peremptory Challenges Based
on Religious Affiliation: Are They Constitutional?, 9 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 139, 199 (2005).
Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives and Discrimination
injury Selection, 66 Md. L. Rev. 279, 284 n.17 (2007).
21. See Burke, supra note 14, at 1470 ("[T]he burden of rebutting th[e] [prima
facie] inference in stage two is extremely low."); Christie Stancil Matthews, Missing Faith
in Batson: Continued Discrimination Against African Americans Through Religion-Based
Peremptory Challenges, 23 Temp. Pol. & CR. L. Rev. 45, 53 (2013) ("[Batson's failure] is
mainly attributable to... the overly-wide latitude lower courts routinely give to proffered
'race-neutral' reasons... ; the failure by many courts to conduct a proper, searching in-
quiry into pretext in the third step; and the inability of the test to adequately account for
subconscious racial bias.").
22. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005) (reciting the Batson framework);
Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and Discrimination After Batson, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 9,
23-24 (1997) (noting that the Batson framework was derived from the Supreme Court's
employment discrimination doctrine).
23. Two notes on nomenclature. First, Batson initially applied to race-based discrimi-
nation only. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82, 96-98 (1986). The doctrine has since
expanded to encompass other types of illegal discrimination. See infra notes 44-48 and
accompanying text. For the sake of readability, this Article sometimes refers only to "race-
based" discrimination, but that reference encompasses all forms of illicit discrimination.
When further distinctions need to be made, this Article uses more specific language.
Second, throughout, this Article speaks of the defendant as the one bringing the Batson
challenge and the prosecutor as the one who made the peremptory strike. This is short-
hand. Prosecution and defense alike can raise Batson challenges. Georgia v. McCollum,
718 [Vol. 118:713
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trial judge moves to step two, where she asks the prosecutor to explain
what motivated the strike.24 Once that answer is provided, the inquiry
moves to the third step, where either party may present additional evi-
dence and where the judge must decide, in light of all the evidence,
whether the strike was motivated by discriminatory intent.
25
As critics have noted, the trouble with this framework is at step two:
The prosecutor can make up any justification she wants for the strike,
and those justifications can be impossible to disprove.26 This is especially
true because there is no requirement that the prosecutor's explanation
be logical or plausible, so long as the prosecutor can convince the judge
that it is sincerely held.27 Bizarre, trivial justifications may count as "race-
neutral." Examples include using a strike because ajuror "[w] ore a beret
one day and a sequined cap the next, '28 or " [m]entioned the word 'gov-
ernment' twice in his answers,"29 or "[1]acked outside hobbies and inter-
ests,"' or "[1]acked 'hope in the legal system.'"31 Anyone with even a
505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992). So can civil litigants. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614, 631 (1991).
24. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168.
25. Id.
26. Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson's Net to Ensnare More than
the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 Cornell L. Rev.
1075, 1075 (2011) (" [W]e conclude that Batson is easily avoided through the articulation
of a purportedly race-neutral explanation for juror strikes."); Nelson, supra note 16, at
1692 (describing "the ease with which a prosecutor may overcome a defendant's showing
of a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the jury-selection process"); id. at
1701 ("As seen in Snyder v. Louisiana, the neutral-explanation test in Batson is too
deferential to prosecutors and allows for the use of pretextual, dubious, and inconsistent
prosecutorial responses."); Ogletree, supra note 16, at 1107 ("[I]n many jurisdictions...
Batson has been more or less undermined by prosecutors who fabricate facially neutral
reasons for striking minority jurors, and trial courts that have difficulty evaluating such
reasons .... '[So] Batson lacks the... "teeth" required to ensure that black jurors are not
excluded on the basis of race.'" (quoting Brian Wilson, Recent Case, Batson v. Kentucky:
Can the 'New' Peremptory Challenge Survive the Resurrection of Strauder v. West
Virginia?, 20 Akron L. Rev. 355, 364 (1986))); id. at 1123 ("To effectively prevent the
racial use of the peremptory challenge, some change in law or procedure will have to ad-
dress the problem at its source: the willingness of trial judges to accept pretexts for racially
discriminatory peremptory strikes.").
27. See Harris v. Haeberlin, 752 F.3d 1054, 1059 (6th Cir. 2014) ("The justification
need not be persuasive; in fact, if true, it may even be 'only a frivolous or utterly non-
sensical justification.'" (quoting Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171)). But see Purkett v. Elem, 514
U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam) ("[I]mplausible or fantastic justifications may (and
probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.").
28. Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 26, at 1094 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).
29. Id. at 1095 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Ervin,
266 F. App'x 428, 436 (6th Cir. 2008)).
30. Id. (citing Lewis v. Bennett, 435 F. Supp. 2d 184, 191 (W.D.N.Y. 2006)).
31. Id. at 1091 (citing People v. Hamilton, 200 P.3d 898, 934 (Cal. 2009)); see also
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769 (finding "[t]he prosecutor's proffered explanation.., that he
struck juror number 22 because he had long, unkempt hair, a mustache, and a beard" to
2018]
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modicum of savvy can choose a justification that is not observable on the
record-such as the claim that the juror was not making good eye con-
tact-thereby making it impossible for trial judges, and later appellate
judges, to disprove the justification.32 The prosecutor has so much
freedom that she practically cannot get caught unless she picks a demon-
strably false or explicitly race-based justification. The ease of inventing
pretexts to satisfy step two can make the entire Batson framework feel like
a farce. A very significant and legitimate criticism, to be sure.
A second, related criticism concerns Batson's requirement that de-
fendants prove intentional discrimination.3" As with all equal protection
claims, Batson requires the court to determine the prosecutor's subjective
intent; it is not enough to show that the prosecutor's actions have a dis-
parate impact.34 The intent requirement has rankled commentators
because it is so difficult to prove. And the problem of proof is particularly
pronounced, given that the prosecutor is given an opportunity, at step
two, to muddy the waters by providing false justifications. Further, the
intent requirement has been criticized for creating a certain social awk-
wardness for judges, insofar as it requires them to say the prosecutor was
racist.31 According to this critique, the awkwardness of branding the
be legitimate at step two); People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 65-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)
("Surely, new prosecutors are given a manual, probably entitled, 'Handy Race-Neutral
Explanations' or '20 Time-Tested Race-Neutral Explanations.'"); Bellin & Semitsu, supra
note 26, at 1091-96 (collecting justifications from cases and studies); J. Thomas Sullivan,
Lethal Discrimination, 26 Harv.J. Racial & EthnicJust. 69, 95 (2010) ("If trialjudges cyni-
cally accept unreasonable, but facially race-neutral, explanations for peremptory striking
of minority venirepersons, the application of deferential standards of appellate review
effectively insulates racially-discriminatory practices in jury selection from meaningful ap-
pellate review.").
32. See Mimi Samuel, Focus on Batson: Let the Cameras Roll, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 95,
97-98 (2008) (explaining prosecutors' reliance on "intangibles such as eye contact, tone
of voice, demeanor, posture, and laughing or coughing" put courts "at a tremendous
disadvantage" in "discern[ing] whether the given reasons are in fact discriminatory
because the courts have little or no evidence" for "assessing the validity of the reason").
33. See Hernandezv. NewYork, 500 U.S. 352, 372 (1991) (O'ConnorJ, concurring)
(noting that parties must prove that "the prosecutor intentionally discriminated" on the
basis of race in order to prove a Batson violation); United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360,
377 (4th Cir. 2010) ("When a party challenges his opponent's exercise of a peremptory
challenge on equal protection grounds, the party bears the burden of proving intentional
discrimination."); see also Anna Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors: Disparate Impact and
the (Mis)use of Batson, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1359, 1367 (2012) (observing that Batson
requires defendants to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination).
34. See Roberts, supra note 33, at 1367.
35. See, e.g., Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 264 (3d Cir. 2010) ("No judge
wants to be in the position of suggesting that a fellow professional-whom the judge may
have known for years-is exercising peremptory challenges based on forbidden racial
considerations."); State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 338 (Wash. 2013) ("A requirement of
conscious discrimination is especially disconcerting because it seemingly requires judges
to accuse attorneys of deceit and racism in order to sustain a Batson challenge."); see also
Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1059, 1085 (2009) ("[R]epeated contact may lead to a
[Vol. 118:713
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prosecutor racist raises the stakes for all involved and is another impedi-
ment to finding a Batson violation."
Still another major critique of Batson is the deference appellate
courts owe to trial court determinations." According to this critique,
because Batson claims are fact-intensive, the trial court is entitled to so
much deference that there is nothing left for the appellate court to do.38
A trial judge could thus doom a Batson claim by making an unfavorable
determination that cannot effectively be reviewed. This Article pushes
back on the conventional wisdom by pointing out how appellate Batson
may offer more opportunities to litigants than the trial doctrine did. Al-
though appellate judges are required to defer to many aspects of the trial
court's Batson rulings, they have found ways to breathe life into Batson
claims, even under the extreme deference required by the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).9 One of the main projects of
this Article is to show how unexpectedly emboldened appellate courts
are when it comes to finding Batson violations, in no small part due to the
civic, political, and moral stakes of the Batson doctrine.
close relationship and bond between the judge and the prosecutor. It therefore makes
sense that the trial judges they appear in front of day after day would be reluctant to take
prosecutors to task publicly.").
36. See supra note 35. There is arguably a difference between a single race-based act
in a lifetime-enough to trigger a Batson violation-and the character of being a racist.
But the point stands that the intent requirement nudges the Batson inquiry from looking
at an individual act toward looking at the prosecutor's character. As will be discussed later
on, there is a sharp distinction between Batson's focus on intent and the Sixth Amendment
fair cross-section doctrine's lack of regard for intent when addressing racial underrep-
resentation in the jury pool. Later on, this Article also describes how Batson's focus on
intent may benefit defendants, by allowing them to bring in a broader range of evidence
about the prosecutor's misdeeds. See infra section I.C.2.
37. See Nancy S. Marder, Batson Revisited, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 1585, 1592 (2012)
[hereinafter Marder, Batson Revisited] ("Another reason that Batson and its progeny have
been so ineffective is that... appellate judges are deferential to trial judges' determi-
nations."); Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74
Fordham L. Rev. 1683, 1708 (2006) [hereinafter Marder, Justice Stevens, the Peremptory
Challenge, and the Jury] ("Although appellate review could correct this problem, at least
by ensuring consistency within a circuit, appellate review of Batson challenges tends to be
quite deferential to the trial judge."); Thibodeaux, supra note 17, at 410 ("A trial court
ruling on discriminatory intent, however, must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous.
Given the propensity for affirmance under this standard or an abuse of discretion stan-
dard, a trial court's ruling is virtually immune to reversal."); see also Daniel R. Pollitt &
Brittany P. Warren, Thirty Years of Disappointment: North Carolina's Remarkable
Appellate Batson Record, 94 N.C. L. Rev. 1957, 1959 (2016) ("North Carolina's highest
court has never once in those thirty years found a substantive Batson violation.").
38. See Marder, Justice Stevens, the Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, supra note
37, at 1708-09.
39. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(2012); see also Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2199 (2015) (describing the highly defer-
ential standard of review under AEDPA).
2018]
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Another vein of criticism concerns Batson's limited scope. Critics
complain that Batson does not protect enough categories of people.
40
Supreme Court decisions have recognized that the Batson doctrine now
covers race-,41 gender-,42 and ethnicity-based peremptories.4 3 State courts
and lower federal courts have extended Batson to include other groups.
44
Well-reasoned criticisms call for extending Batson to strikes based on sex-
ual orientation,45 disability,4 6 religion,47 and other characteristics.4'
There is some tension between the criticism that Batson is ineffectual
and the criticism that it covers too few characteristics. If the doctrine
were toothless, it should not matter how much or how little it purports to
40. See, e.g., Jonathan Grossman, Sixth Dist. Appellate Program,
Wheeler/Batson Developments 4 (2006), http://www.fdap.org/downloads/Seminar06/
wheelermaterials.web.pdf [http://perma.cc/EW2B-3SL5] (collecting cases showing cat-
egories not covered by Batson, including "[p]oor people," " [y]oung adults," "[p]eople
who do not speak English," "[p]eople who have been arrested, been victims, or believe in
law and order," and "[p] eople with long hair and beard").
41. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (discussing race-based peremptories).
42. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129-30 (1994) (extending Batson
to cover gender-based peremptories).
43. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991) (extending Batson to cover
ethnic origin).
44. Grossman, supra note 40, at 3-4 (listing cases from state and federal courts that
have expanded the Batson doctrine to cover additional groups such as "Hispanics,"
"[h] omosexuals," and religious groups).
45. See Tania Tetlow, Solving Batson, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1859, 1868 n.32 (2015)
("Circuits are split about the application of the Batson rule to sexual orientation, but if
that is recognized as a suspect category, it should be included in this analysis as well.");
John J. Neal, Note, Striking Batson Gold at the End of the Rainbow?: Revisiting Batson v.
Kentucky and Its Progeny in Light of Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas, 91 Iowa L. Rev.
1091, 1113 (2006) (advocating for sexual-orientation protection); see also Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 231.5 (West 2016) (protecting against discrimination under a number of cate-
gories, including race, color, religion, ancestry, disability, genetic information, and sexual
orientation); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2014)
(holding that equal protection prohibits strikes based on sexual orientation).
46. See Mary A. Lynch, The Application of Equal Protection to Prospective Jurors
with Disabilities: Will Batson Cover Disability-Based Strikes?, 57 Alb. L. Rev. 289, 293
(1993).
47. See Matthews, supra note 21, at 63-64 ("The Supreme Court should specifically
address the constitutionality of religion-based strikes, and such strikes should be pro-
hibited, given that religion, like race and gender, has traditionally been deemed a suspect
classification."); Courtney A. Waggoner, Note, Peremptory Challenges and Religion: The
Unanswered Prayer for a Supreme Court Opinion, 36 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 285, 328 (2004)
("The Supreme Court should ... rule against the government's ability to exercise per-
emptory challenges based upon a potential juror's religious affiliation.").
48. Lynch, supra note 46, at 318 ("Relying on Batson and its progeny-which has
tended to extend rather than limit Batson's scope-many lower courts.., have decided to
extend Batson to discrimination claims of gender-, ethnic-, and age-based peremptory
strikes. Other courts have limited Batson to race-based strikes."); cf. Revesz, supra note 18,
at 2537 (suggesting "peremptory-challenge procedures" should be eliminated for their
ideological effect on juries because they "produce juries that are considerably more con-
servative than a random sampling of Americans").
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protect. One way to resolve this tension, however, is to think of Batson's
symbolic importance, independent of its effectiveness. The doctrine lim-
its what characteristics may lawfully be used to exclude citizens from par-
ticipation in the basic civic institution of the jury. Batson's protection of a
particular group is an affirmation that the group members belong as full
participants in society.49 As argued below, this democratic symbolism is
no small part of Batson's success as a doctrine, especially on appeal and in
postconviction proceedings.
B. Batson s Oddities
The above account catalogues Batson's functional failings. Another
level of criticism takes aim at the doctrine's theoretical coherence. For
better or worse, Batson is something of a doctrinal oddball. This section
reflects on several of Batson's most prominent oddities. These quirks do
not, individually or collectively, preclude Batson from playing a promi-
nent role in antidiscrimination law, but they do make Batson something
of a surprising choice for this role, especially compared to doctrines that
are more theoretically straightforward in their attacks on systemic
discrimination.
First is the question of what right (or rights) Batson is supposed to
protect. One might be surprised not to find a straightforward answer to
this basic question. The Batson Court justified its decision in terms of pro-
tecting the constitutional rights of defendants and jurors.5" Subsequent
Supreme Court cases have emphasized the jurors' rights over the de-
fendants' (and included all manner of litigants) .5 As scholars have
noted, this change in emphasis has implicated another doctrinal oddity:
The jurors' rights are vindicated not by the jurors themselves but by third
parties, namely, the litigants.5 2 Such third-party standing is rather unusu-
al in constitutional litigation, yet it is the foundation on which Batson
rests.53 Among its unusual implications, the reliance on third-party
standing means that jurors can effectively be barred from service, with no
49. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (noting the Framers' "in-
sistence upon community participation in the determination of guilt or innocence");
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (describing harm that accrues to
African American citizens from being excluded from jury participation).
50. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-87 (1986) (referring to the rights of the
defendant and the juror).
51. Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 Mich.
L. Rev. 2001, 2015 (1998) [hereinafter Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies] ("Over the
past decade, the Court has moved toward the view that the victim in Batson cases is the ex-
cludedjuror.").
52. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991) ("An individual juror does not have a
right to sit on any particular petit jury, but he or she does possess the right not to be
excluded from one on account of race.").
53. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 629 (1991) (discussing a third
party's ability to vindicate ajuror's rights).
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remedy, if both the defendant and the prosecutor choose not to challenge
the exclusion.54
The remedy for a Batson violation also raises theoretical concerns. At
trial, the remedy is to reseat the juror who was struck or, more frequent-
ly, to draw an entirely new venire.55 Post-trial, the remedy is an automatic
reversal of the conviction.56 A fascinating academic literature explores
the potential mismatch between right and remedy.57 If the juror is the
one whose rights are violated, how does drawing a new venire vindicate
the juror's rights, as the struck juror will not be in the new venire?58 If
Batson protects the defendant's rights, on what theoretical basis does it
54. In Swain litigation, see infra section I.C, it used to be a problem that both sides
would agree to wholesale exclusion ofjurors of a particular race. However, a judge could
raise a Batson objection sua sponte. See, e.g., People v. Rivera, 852 N.E.2d 771, 784 (Ill.),
modified on denial of reh'g, (Ill. 2006); People v. Bell, 702 N.W.2d 128, 134 (Mich.),
amended on denial of reh'g by 704 N.W.2d 69 (Mich. 2005).
55. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 n.24 (expressing "no view on whether it is more
appropriate... for the trial court to discharge the venire and select a new jury from a
panel.., or to disallow the discriminatory challenges and resume selection with the
improperly challenged jurors reinstated on the venire" (citation omitted)); United States
v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 474 (D. Conn. 1976), mandamus granted sub nom. United
States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
56. See Tankleffv. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 248 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Because the effects
of racial discrimination during voir dire 'may persist through the whole course of the trial
proceedings,' we hold that a Batson/Powers claim is a structural error that is not subject to
harmless error review." (quoting Powers, 499 U.S. at 412)); Rosa v. Peters, 36 F.3d 625, 634
n.17 (7th Cir. 1994); Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1225 n.6 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc);
Brian R. Means, Postconviction Remedies § 30:2, Westlaw (database updated June 2017)
[hereinafter Means, Postconviction Remedies] (stating that the use of peremptory chal-
lenges on the basis of race or gender gives rise to structural error). But cf. Karlan, Race,
Rights, and Remedies, supra note 51, at 2019 n.87 (providing examples of when courts
have found no structural error as long as some African Americans remain in the jury
pool).
57. Professor Karlan's writing on the relationship between the Batson right and the
Batson remedy is extremely useful in drawing out the swirl of interests at work. See Pamela
S. Karlan, Batson v. Kentucky The Constitutional Challenges of Peremptory Challenges, in
Criminal Procedure Stories 381, 396-97 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) [hereinafter Karlan,
Batson] (discussing Batson amicus briefs that expressed the view that the constitutional
Batson remedy would occur at the trial level and would involve relatively small transaction
costs); see also Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies, supra note 51, at 2004 (exploring "the
complications that arise in the definition of rights and in the operation of remedies when
the Equal Protection Clause is used in criminal adjudication").
58. Of course, if the improperly struck juror has not left the courtroom, courts can
also reseat the juror, which would at least remedy the wrong suffered by that juror. But
that is less typical. The reason that juror is not often reseated is in large part due to the
logistics of jury selection. The juror might have already been instructed to leave the
courtroom by the time the defense makes the Batson challenge, as there is no requirement
that the challenge be made immediately after the strike. See United States v. Rodriguez,
917 F.2d 1286, 1288 n.4 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that a Batson challenge is timely when
made before jurors take the oath and the trial begins), abrogated by Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400 (1991); United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d. 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 1987) (allow-
ing a Batson challenge "just after" the jury was sworn in). And if the juror is removed and
then reseated, thatjuror may develop suspicions about who struck her and why.
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do so? Is it because a black juror is presumed to vote differently from a
white one, so the race-based strike is presumed to have affected the ver-
dict by changing the racial composition of the jury? And does that com-
mit the courts to the uncomfortable position that jurors act differently
based on their race? Does it mean that only defendants whose cases
would have come out differently with a different jury are entitled to
relief? Or is the defendant given a new venire or new trial because of a
principled harm: She was tried by a jury tainted by discrimination? But
why should this symbolic harm result in the powerful medicine of throw-
ing out a conviction? Later on, this Article returns in more depth to the
implications of the almost-unanimous view that Batson violations require
automatic reversal, free of any harmless error analysis.59
Another oddity-not at all to say flaw-of Batson's antidiscrimination
bona fides is its availability to prosecutors60 and civil litigants,61 rather
than just criminal defendants. There is nothing inconsistent with allow-
ing prosecutors and civil litigants to counteract discrimination in the
justice system, but there is some level of irony that a doctrine created to
defend African American defendants against deep-seated, institutional
racism now allows prosecutors to prevent the removal of white jurors or
corporations to prevent the removal of male jurors. The unusual nature
of Batson as a doctrine that protects jurors and all litigants-not just crim-
inal defendants-adds to Batson's effectiveness.
The final oddity to mention involves the theatricality of Batson's
pleading framework. This theatricality, this Article argues, is not inci-
dental to the success of the doctrine.62 Unlike any other forum, Batson
puts government officials on the spot to account, in a public manner, for
their discriminatory actions. This morality play takes the structural racism
that pervades the justice system and gives it a human face: the prosecu-
tor's. This personification makes the racism easier to envision. It also
makes the taint of racism seem more limited and manageable than when
it is conceptualized in institutional terms.6 3 This theater is an important,
59. See infra section ILA; see also Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies, supra note 51,
at 2016 ("The movement toward ajuror-centered view of the Batson right was tempting in
part because it enabled the Court to finesse the question whether the race or sex of a jury's
members affects trial outcomes.").
60. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (holding that "the Constitution
prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground
of race in the exercise of peremptory strikes").
61. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (holding that even
in civil cases, "race-based exclusion violates the equal protection rights of the challenged
jurors").
62. See infra section III.C.
63. One of the reasons that Batson is a more appealing claim than the fair cross-
section or discriminatory-prosecution claims, see infra section IC, is that it is individ-
ualized to a single unconstitutional act-a single strike. An appellate court that finds a fair
cross-section violation in the drawing of a county's jury pool will potentially call into doubt
hundreds of other convictions-or it would if there were not such steep hurdles to
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and unusual, aspect of constitutional litigation. And, as this Article ar-
gues later on, Batson's pageantry has the key benefit of allowing judges-
especially appellate judges-to declaim on broad principles of justice.
64
Batson transforms the peremptories into a morality play about which cit-
izens may be excluded from civic participation and on what grounds, and
it affords appellate judges the rare prompt to talk about structural dis-
crimination in the justice system.
C. Batson s Antidiscrimination Comparators
The critiques of Batson's failings and its quirks are in many respects
quite reasonable. But they fail to consider Batson in comparison to other
antidiscrimination claims. Although Batson is flawed in many respects, it
is arguably the only meaningful vehicle for challenging racial discrimina-
tion in jury selection and in the justice system more generally.65 This sec-
tion discusses Batson's less auspicious comparators in antidiscrimination
claims, in an effort to show Batson's comparative strengths.
1. Swain v. Alabama. - Swain v. Alabama66 was the immediate pre-
decessor to Batson. Swain prohibited race-based peremptory strikes but
only in the most extreme circumstances. Under Swain, the defendant
could prevail on equal protection grounds only by showing that the pros-
ecutor had a virtually unbroken pattern of striking African American
jurors "in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime
and whoever the defendant or the victim may be" such that "no Negroes
ever serve on petit juries."67 If the prosecutor struck black jurors most,
but not all, of the time, or if the prosecutor struck black jurors only in
cases in which the defendant was also black, that pattern would not be
enough to satisfy Swain. Likewise, even if the prosecutor's strikes were
persistent enough to satisfy Swain, there was still the problem of proof.
The defendant was required to obtain and analyze extensive data on
strikes in other cases to establish the prosecutor's unbroken pattern.
68
pleading fair cross-section claims that were not litigated at trial. See infra section I.C.
Likewise, a court finding that a prosecutor has engaged in selective prosecution or
selective administration of the death penalty would have to confront the systemic impli-
cations of such a finding. Even if other cases cannot be reopened for procedural reasons,
the fact that a prosecutor was making charging decisions based on race undermines the
fairness of all the convictions to have come from that prosecutor's office. Finding a Batson
violation in a single case does not bring along with it such systemic implications, even if
evidence of a prosecutor's violations in one case may be used in other cases to show the
prosecutor's bias.
64. See infra section III.C.
65. See infra notes 104-107 and accompanying text (noting the number of times that
people have won Batson claims).
66. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
67. Id. at 223.
68. Bruce J. Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases:
An Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1982) ("Not only
does such a showing require transcribing voir dires of a large number of cases, itself an
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The defendant could not use any evidence from his own case about how
the prosecutor had used his strikes.69 These extensive data were extreme-
ly difficult to gather, even when they existed, and in many instances there
was simply no record of whom a prosecutor had struck in other cases,
much less that person's race.
70
The Court in Batson specifically addressed these shortcomings of
Swain and attempted to make such equal protection challenges easier to
plead and win.7 As will be shown later on in this Article, Swain was not
wholly discarded. To this day, litigants wishing to raise Swain claims can
do so instead of, or in addition to, Batson claims. They just have to refer
to the prosecutor's behavior in other cases. Indeed, the more Batson
claims rely on extra-record evidence to show discriminatory intent, the
more Batson begins to resemble Swain.
72
2. Fair Cross-Section. - Another comparator to Batson is the fair
cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment, as articulated by the
Supreme Court in Duren v. Missouri.73 Like Swain, but unlike Batson, fair
cross-section claims are systemic challenges. The Sixth Amendment guar-
antees criminal defendants the right to be tried by an impartial jury of
their peers,7 4 and the fair cross-section doctrine requires that the veni-
re-the pool of jurors summoned to appear for service-is sufficiently
representative of the community. If the jury-summons system results in
significant and repeated underrepresentation of a cognizable group, the
fair cross-section requirement may be violated.
75
In theory, this doctrine has great potential. While it may be impossi-
ble to root out discrimination in peremptory strikes, the effect of this
discrimination could be blunted by having jury pools that have represen-
tatively large numbers of minority jurors-the goal of the fair cross-section
expensive undertaking, but additional investigation would be required to ascertain the
race of each venireperson .... [This] is beyond the ability and resources of virtually all
defendants.").
69. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 223.
70. See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 767-68 (Cal. 1978) ("[Under Swain,] the
defendant would be required to somehow obtain and analyze the records of an
undetermined number of individual trials .... But he would have no practical way of
discovering which of the excused jurors were black, or of proving their race even if he
could learn of it .... ").
71. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92-93 (1986) (finding that the prevailing
interpretation of Swain places a "crippling burden of proof" on defendants and rejecting
this formulation as inconsistent with equal protection jurisprudence).
72. See infra section II.B (discussing extra-record Batson evidence).
73. See 439 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1979); see also Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 319
(2010) (describing the test set out in Duren).
74. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
75. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). Even if there is a persistent
underrepresentation caused by the summons system, the state is given an opportunity to
justify it on some grounds, such as a "significant state interest." See Duren, 439 U.S. at 367-
69.
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doctrine. Or, put another way, if minority jurors are underrepresented in
the jury pool, it is easier for the prosecutor to use her peremptory strikes
to make the jury entirely white than if there are more minority jurors in
the venire. An additional virtue of the fair cross-section doctrine, at least
in principle, is that there is no need to prove discriminatory intent; all
that is required is a significant and systemic underrepresentation of a
cognizable group.7 6 That is true because the Sixth Amendment right,
unlike its Fifth Amendment analogue, does not require a showing of pur-
poseful discrimination.
Despite these theoretical advantages, however, subsequent Supreme
Court decisions have severely degraded the fair cross-section doctrine
described in Duren. For example, the Court has hampered fair cross-
section challenges by its insistence that defendants identify, with particu-
larity, what mechanism of the jury-summons process is responsible for
the underrepresentation in the venire.77 This is a difficult task for de-
fendants to undertake because while the underrepresentation can be
relatively easily observed, it may be that no one knows why this un-
derrepresentation is occurring (or it may be that a confluence of factors
leads to the underrepresentation). Identifying the particular cause of the
underrepresentation is made even more difficult by the policies of many
clerks of court to abstain from tracking demographic information about
their jury lists-a decision that appears to have been made with the
intent of foreclosing fair cross-section challenges.
78
And still another flaw of the fair cross-section doctrine, as if another
flaw were required, is the application of the doctrine to groups that make
up a small percentage of the population. Many courts measure the "abso-
lute disparity," which is the number of percentage points between a
group's representation in the jury-eligible population and that group's
representation in the venire.79 (If African Americans make up seventeen
percent of the jury-eligible population and just twelve percent of the
76. Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 n.26 (noting that equal protection challenges require dis-
criminatory purpose but that, "[i] n contrast, in Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section cases,
systematic disproportion itself demonstrates an i fringement of the defendant's interest in
ajury chosen from a fair community cross section").
77. Berghuis, 559 U.S. at 332 (noting, albeit in the deferential posture of federal
habeas review, that " [n]o 'clearly established' precedent of this Court supports Smith's
claim that he can make out a prima facie case merely by pointing to a host of factors that,
individually or in combination, might contribute to a group's underrepresentation").
78. See Rosa Holdeman, Inst. for Court Mgmt., Hispanic Representation in Jury
Panels of the Superior Court of California, County of Orange Is Unknown 35 (2009),
http://www.ncsc.org/-/media/Files/PDF/Education%20and%20Careers/CEDP%20Papers/
2009/HoldemanHispanicRepJuryPanels.ashx [http://perma.cc/M5SA-S2H4] ("The cur-
rent policy of not collecting race and ethnicity data is primarily based on the fear of po-
tential jury challenges.").
79. See, e.g., United States v. Royal, 174 F.3d 1, 6-8 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that six
circuits have endorsed the absolute-disparity or closely related "absolute impact" method
of calculating misrepresentation).
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venire, the "absolute disparity" would be five percentage points.)
Although there is no hard-and-fast cutoff, many published decisions
parrot the notion that the defendant must show an absolute disparity of
seven-plus percentage points-sometimes the threshold is quoted as ten
percentage points-in order to make out a fair cross-section violation.
8 0
This is a nearly insurmountable bar to fair cross-section protection for
groups that make up less than ten percent of the population. It means
that even if such group members are completely excluded from the
venire, that exclusion will not cross the ten percent threshold needed to
trigger a fair cross-section claim.
81
In sum, these and other flaws with the fair cross-section doctrine
have left commentators to bemoan the doctrine's demise.8 2 A basic
search of fair cross-section decisions over the last decade-both state and
federal-reveals just a single fair cross-section victory.81 Though the
search was not exhaustive, and there may be a number of victories that
never made it into Westlaw's database, the result is suggestive of the doc-
trine's anemia.
3. Ham and Ristaino. - Still another way to combat discrimination
injury selection is to allow robust questioning about jurors' racial biases.
If racial bias emerges from the questioning in voir dire-and it is an
open question whether jurors would admit to as much in court-that
could be the basis of for-cause and peremptory strikes. Vigorous ques-
tioning seems like an innocuous way to confront racial discrimination,
and it has the benefit of not requiring the court to decide who can and
cannot serve on the jury. All the court has to do is allow the parties to ask
questions to get more detailed information about the jurors. Despite the
upside of such questioning, the Supreme Court has pulled back on the
80. United States v. Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d 1154, 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2014)
(en banc) (noting and ultimately rejecting circuit law creating a 7.7% threshold); United
States v. Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, 1078-79 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting a ten percent threshold
for absolute disparity).
81. E.g., Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d at 1161 ("Indeed, we have specifically high-
lighted the fact that if a minority group makes up less than 7.7% of the population in the
jurisdiction in question, that group could never be underrepresented in the jury pool, even
if none of its members wound up on the qualified jury wheel.").
82. See Mary R. Rose & Jeffrey B. Abramson, Data, Race, and the Courts: Some
Lessons on Empiricism from Jury Representation Cases, 2011 Mich. St. L. Rev. 911, 959
(noting the "enormous investigative burden on the defense" imposed by the requirement
to identify the cause of underrepresentation); David M. Coriell, Note, An (Un)fair Cross
Section: How the Application of Duren Undermines the Jury, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 463, 465
(2015) ("Placing the burden on the defendant to prove how a specific jury-selection pro-
cedure is responsible for nonrepresentative jury venires is a high bar that often renders
the fair cross section guarantee illusory.").
83. The Westlaw search queried <"fair cros!" /s violat!> in the "Holding" field. For
the period runningJanuary 1, 2008 through November 4, 2017, one fair cross-section vic-
tory resulted: Garcia-Dorantes v. Warren, 801 F.3d 584, 587 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 1823 (2016).
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notion that the Constitution protects a defendant's right to ask these
questions about racial biases.
In Ham v. South Carolina, a black defendant alleged that his prosecu-
tion for possession of marijuana was retaliation for his work as a civil
rights activist.'4 The trial judge denied the defendant's request to have the
jurors questioned about racial prejudice.5 The Supreme Court reversed
Ham's conviction on due process grounds because of the judge's "refusal
to make any inquiry as to racial bias of the prospective jurors."86 Three
years later, however, the Supreme Court significantly limited this holding
in Ristaino v. Ross.7 In Ristaino, a black defendant accused of attacking a
white security guard was not allowed to question jurors about racial
prejudices.8 The Supreme Court held it was not a constitutional vio-
lation for the judge to prevent such questioning."9 The earlier decision in
Ham was limited to circumstances in which "[r] acial issues.., were inex-
tricably bound up with the conduct of the trial"-and that was not the
case in Ristaino.
9°
Later cases have tinkered around the edges with defining when
questioning is constitutionally required.91 But the message is clear: The
Constitution will not assist a defendant in questioning her way to a racially
impartial jury, except in certain unusual circumstances.92 A basic search
of a decade's worth of cases citing Ristaino turned up one victory."
The picture does not get any rosier if one looks beyond jury selection
to other attempts to address race in the justice system. Racial disparities
in charging and sentencing have an enormous effect on the criminal
justice system. In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court was confronted
with strong statistical evidence of racial discrimination in capital sen-
tencing decisions.4 But McCleskey effectively closed the door on discrimi-
natory-prosecution claims, holding that a strong statistical correlation was
84. 409 U.S. 524, 524-25 (1973).
85. Id. at 525-26.
86. Id. at 529.
87. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
88. Id. at 590.
89. Id. at 597.
90. Id.
91. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 33 (1986) (declaring the capital nature of the
trial to be a circumstance under which questioning about bias must be allowed).
92. See, e.g., Nancy Lewis Alvarez, Note, Racial Bias and the Right to an Impartial
Jury: A Standard for Allowing Voir Dire Inquiry, 33 Hastings L.J. 959, 961 (1982) (noting
that the Ristaino line of cases "unduly limit[s]" the constitutional right to question jurors
about bias).
93. For the period running January 1, 2008 through November 4, 2017, a Westlaw
search of all cases citing Ristaino v. Ross resulted in just one defense victory: United States
v. Bates, 590 F. App'x 882, 884, 886 (11th Cir. 2014).
94. 481 U.S. 279, 286-87, 295 (1987).
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not enough to prove discrimination;95 the defendant had to show that
discrimination was the cause of the sentencing decision in his particular
case-an almost impossible burden. The Court's decision in United States
v. Armstrong made discriminatory prosecution even harder to prove by
raising the bar for obtaining the very discovery necessary to meet the bar
set by McCleskey.96 A basic search of a decade's worth of "discriminatory
charging" and "selective prosecution" decisions turned up one trial
victory and one intermediate appellate court victory-both of which were
reversed by reviewing courts.97 One additional case satisfied the
threshold for ordering discovery.
98
Arguably, even this dismal state of affairs is more encouraging than
the Fourth Amendment's position on racial discrimination. In Whren v.
United States, the Supreme Court held that the subjective intent of an
officer was not relevant to the Fourth Amendment inquiry into the con-
stitutionality of a traffic stop.99 While selective enforcement of the laws
violates the Constitution, the Court held, the way to challenge that "is the
Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment."10 0 According to
Whren, "Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis."10 1
Swain, Duren, Ham-Ristaino, McCleskey, and Whren-this is the anti-
discrimination company Batson keeps. Of course, the Supreme Court will
occasionally call out racial discrimination in a sui generis criminal case,
as it did during the October 2016 term in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado
0 2
and Buck v. Davis.103 But the Court appears to have little appetite for anti-
discrimination claims that apply to more than one or two idiosyncratic
cases.
95. Id. at 297.
96. 517 U.S. 456, 468 (1996) ("The justifications for a rigorous standard for the
elements of a selective-prosecution claim thus require a correspondingly rigorous standard
for discovery in aid of such a claim."); see also Melissa L. Jampol, Goodbye to the Defense
of Selective Prosecution, 87J. Crim. L. & Criminology 932, 932 (1997) (arguing that "the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Armstrong imposes a barrier that is too high for
almost any defendant alleging selective prosecution to obtain discovery, thus making the
already difficult claim of race-based selective prosecution virtually impossible to prove").
97. In the holding field, the search queried <"discriminatory charging" or "selective
prosecution"> for the period January 1, 2008, through November 4, 2017. There was one
trial court victory: State v. Pope, 713 S.E.2d 537, 540 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). There was one
appellate court victory: Lovill v. State, 287 S.W.3d 65, 81 (Tex. App. 2008), rev'd, 319
S.W.3d 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
98. Commonwealth v. Bernardo B., 900 N.E.2d 834, 846 (Mass. 2009).
99. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017) (reversing the conviction because ajuror admitted that
bias against the defendant and a witness guided his decision).
103. 137 S. Ct. 759, 775 (2017) (reversing on grounds that the defense expert asserted
defendant's future dangerousness was increased by his race).
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Given the lack of alternatives to fight racial discrimination in the jus-
tice system, Batson becomes all the more important, despite its flaws. It is
the only doctrine in this beleaguered group under which defendants ac-
tually have a chance to prevail. The same type of basic Westlaw query that
turned up one fair cross-section victory, one jury-questioning victory, and
zero discriminatory-prosecution victories in over a decade, turned up
forty Batson wins over the same period.'°4 (And there are a number of
additional Batson wins, even among the cases cited in this Article, that
were not captured by this very elementary search."5) Although this search
method is crude, it provides some data for the anecdotal observation that
winning Batson decisions are more commonly encountered than other
types of antidiscrimination victories.'°6 It is worth adding that Batson
claims, not just Batson victories, are probably more numerous than other
types of antidiscrimination claims because Batson can easily be raised and
preserved in any case in which there was jury selection. Fair cross-section
and discriminatory-prosecution claims, on the other hand, require
104. For the period from January 1, 2008 through November 4, 2017, the following
search was queried on Westlaw to count the number of defense victories: <Holding:
(Batson /s violat!)>. This search resulted in forty Batson victories (including remands for
further evidentiary proceedings), suggesting Batson is more successful than its peers.
105. See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008); Shirley v. Yates, 807 F.3d 1090,
1106 n.16 (9th Cir. 2015); Adkins v. Warden, Holman CF, 710 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir.
2013); United States v. McAllister, 693 F.3d 572, 581 (6th Cir. 2012); Harris v. Hardy, 680
F.3d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 2012); Rice v. White, 660 F.3d 242, 243 (6th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Rutledge, 648 F.3d 555, 557 (7th Cir. 2011); Reynoso v. Hall, 395 F. App'x 344,
345 (9th Cir. 2010); Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364, 365 (5th Cir. 2009); Dolphy v.
Mantello, 552 F.3d 236, 237 (2d Cir. 2009); Paulino v. Harrison, 542 F.3d 692, 695 (9th
Cir. 2008); Harris v. Haeberlin, 526 F.3d 903, 905 (6th Cir. 2008); Rizo v. Kernan, Nos.
EDCV 03-787-JAK (AJW), EDCV 03-822-JAK (AJW), EDCV 03-824-JAK (AJW), EDCV 03-
901-JAK (AJW), 2016 WL 8606275, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2016), adopted by No. EDCV-
03-787JAK (AJW), 2017 WL 1115150 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2017); Mitcham v. Davis, 103 F.
Supp. 3d 1091, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2015); City of Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124, 1131
(Wash. 2017); People v. Gutierrez, 395 P.3d 186, 189 (Cal.), reh'g denied by 2017 Cal.
LEXIS 5957 (Cal. July 26, 2017).
106. Two caveats: First, some may consider forty, or even one hundred, wins across a
decade as essentially zero-just like the other antidiscrimination doctrines. But defense
appellate victories are rare enough that it does not seem reasonable to equate forty with
zero, at least in this author's view. Second, the method of searching for published and
unpublished opinions does not account for trial victories if there is no written decision.
There are likely more Batson trial victories than there are fair cross-section, discriminatory-
charging, or other types of antidiscrimination trial victories. This assumption is based on
the fact that Batson trial claims, more than other types of claims, can be made spon-
taneously, without extensive briefing and pleading. When a Batson trial victory occurs,
there is unlikely to be an appeal by the prosecution; rather, jury selection just restarts. See
infra section II.A. Whereas, if defendants were winning other types of more research-
intensive claims at trial, those decisions would be appealed and result in written opinions.
For this reason, this Article's simplistic method of searching for Batson wins may actually
underestimate Batson wins to a greater extent than it underestimates other doctrines' wins.
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significant extra-record research to raise and preserve-a point this
Article returns to shortly.
10 7
All of these factors contribute to making Batson a more vibrant and
significant doctrine than its antidiscrimination competitors. In criminal
cases overrun by racial discrimination, Batson may be the only arrow in
the quiver for a judge-especially an appellate judge-who wants to
remedy the blight of discrimination. But commentary on Batson has been
too quick to dismiss Batson's virtues, too quick to lose focus of Batson's
proper context, because the commentary has focused too little on what
Batson can do post-trial.
II. BA TSON S APPELLATE-TRIAL DIDE
Batson appellate claims are extremely difficult to win. There should
be no confusion on this point. It is hard enough to prevail on a Batson
claim at trial, but the "great deference" that appellate courts must give to
trial court Batson determinations makes it even more difficult. 10 8 At the
same time, appellate Batson offers a number of opportunities that are not
available to litigants at trial. This Article argues that these opportunities
cause appellate Batson to punch above its trial weight, and that this di-
vergence between trial and post-trial Batson has not previously been
acknowledged.
This may sound like a paradox. How can Batson appellate and post-
conviction litigation provide more opportunities than Batson trial litiga-
tion when the appellate courts owe deference to the trial judgments? The
answer has several parts. First, the value of a Batson victory on appeal and
habeas is far greater than it is at trial, so even if Batson claims are less
likely to succeed post-trial, their victories are nonetheless more valuable.
Second, the types of evidence and arguments that can be advanced in
post-trial Batson claims differ from, and exceed, those that are available at
trial. Indeed, the topic of Part II is one of the main contributions of this
Article: an illustration of the ways in which Batson postconviction litiga-
tion is more expansive than at trial. This divergence between trial and
post-trial Batson has been largely overlooked, obscuring Batson's potential
as a doctrine that can go beyond jury selection. This Part fleshes out the
divergence between trial and post-trial Batson and identifies ways in which
the appellate side of the doctrine is growing in importance, even as the
trial side of the doctrine is receding.
107. Does it erode the meaningfulness of Batson if it has both more wins and more
claims than its comparator doctrines? That might depend on how many more claims there
really are-and there are no practical ways to estimate this. This Article argues that what
makes Batson meaningful is, first, that litigants can actually deploy it, and second, that
there are a non-negligible number of Batson wins. It is still a long shot, to be sure, but
Batson wins are not unheard of, whereas other types of antidiscrimination wins effectively
are.
108. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
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A. Difference in Remedy Between Trial and Appellate-Habeas Litigation
To understand why Batson might be more significant to appellate lit-
igants than trial litigants, start with the remedy. In baseball terms, a trial
Batson win is a single or maybe a double. Post-trial, a Batson win is a home
run-or more. Consider, for example, that if a Batson violation is recog-
nized at trial, the remedy is to return the struck juror to the box or, more
often, to dismiss the current jurors and draw a new venire.1 9 For the de-
fendant, the benefits are uncertain and relatively modest. Reseating the
struck juror may improve the ultimate outcome of the case. Or it may
not. It is hard to gauge at the outset how any individual juror will vote.
Redrawing an entirely new venire could result in a significantly better
choice of jurors. Or it could result in a venire that is substantially the
same as-or worse than-the original one. This is the sense in which the
value of a trial Batson win is uncertain. Granted, if the prosecutor has al-
ready struck six African American jurors by the time the court declares
the Batson violation, there is good reason to think that the new venire will
be more favorable to the defense (assuming the court does not permit
the prosecutor to strike African American jurors like that again). But in
situations in which there are one or two suspicious strikes, it is far less
clear how and whether a Batson win will affect the outcome of the case.
The only thing certain is that a Batson win at trial will set back the start of
the trial, perhaps by a few hours, perhaps by a few days or weeks. Hardly
a significant victory.
On appeal and in postconviction proceedings, however, Batson's
remedy is much more significant: automatic reversal of the conviction.
The automatic nature of the reversal is significant in setting apart post-
trial Batson from trial Batson and in distinguishing Batson from other ap-
pellate and habeas doctrines. The key point is that Batson is a "structural
error."" Structural errors are those that affect not the trial itself but the
framework and mechanics for holding the trial.' When a court finds a
structural error, it does not go through the steps of analyzing whether
any harm accrued to the defendant because of the error."2 Rather, the
court must throw out the conviction, even if there is such overwhelming
109. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 n.24 (1986).
110. Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 248 (2d Cir. 1998); see also supra note 56
and accompanying text.
111. Tankleff, 135 F.3d at 240 ("Harmless error analysis is inappropriate in this con-
text, however, because exclusion ofjurors on the basis of race is a structural error that can
never be harmless."); id. at 248.
112. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (noting structural errors
that include "unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant's race from a grand jury");
Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies, supra note 51, at 2018 ("Despite the recent spread of
harmless error doctrine throughout constitutional criminal procedure, the federal courts
that have considered the question have generally treated Batson violations as structural and
thus subject to per se reversal."). But see id. at 2019 n.87 (noting that some outlier courts
have applied harmless error review to Batson violations).
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evidence against the defendant that she would have been convicted had
the error not occurred. "Structural error" claims, like Batson and a few
others, stand out for not being subject to "harmless error review."'1" The
exemption is critically important for appellate and habeas litigants
because harmless error analysis is a major hurdle."4 In other habeas
doctrines, for example, a defendant will not be able to win relief even if
she has the most well-documented, clear-cut constitutional violation, if
the evidence against her is significant enough that she would have been
convicted had the error not occurred.115 Such is the challenge of harmless
error review: It moots out wide swaths of constitutional rights for defen-
dants who have overwhelming evidence against them. In capital cases, in
which there are separate guilt and penalty trials, another threat from
harmless error analysis is the potential for the court to find that a con-
stitutional violation affected only the penalty phase of the trial, thus
leaving the guilty verdict untouched.116 Courts have more latitude in de-
fining what is harmless than in defining what is a constitutional violation,
so they can sidestep deciding a constitutional question under the guise of
saying that the harmlessness analysis was more clear-cut."7
Batson's immunity from harmless error review gives it a special luster
post-trial that it lacks at trial, and this helps to explain part of the diver-
gence between trial and post-trial practice. For inmates serving long prison
113. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310. In Batson, the idea of quantifying any prejudice is
particularly difficult because it is not clear that any one juror's presence or absence would
change the outcome, unless one presupposes that jurors are more likely to vote for par-
ticular outcomes based on race. So a requirement to show prejudice would be concep-
tually impossible, on top of all the other difficulties inherent in peering into the black box
of the jury.
114. See Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal Justice:
How the New Right Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court's Criminal Justice Jurisprudence,
94 Geo. L.J. 1385, 1408 n.152 (2006) (discussing the harmless error hurdle); Brent E.
Newton, A Primer on Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Review, Champion, June 2005, at 16,
18 (on file with the Columbia Law Review and available in full on Westlaw) (discussing
"hurdles," including harmless error review). There are different standards regarding who
bears the burden of proving the error was harmless and what that burden consists of. See,
e.g., Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 421, 428 n.77 (1980) (noting that the Supreme Court has promulgated dif-
ferent standards as to the burden of proof in harmless error review).
115. See Newton, supra note 114, at 18 (explaining the standard for harmless error in
federal habeas review).
116. See Linda E. Carter, Harmless Error in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Case: A
Doctrine Misunderstood and Misapplied, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 125, 125-26 (1993).
117. See, e.g., Lipscomb v. Carothers, No. 88-3788, 1989 WL 117192, at *1 n.2 (9th
Cir. Sept. 29, 1989); cf. Metrolimo, Inc. v. Lamm, 666 So. 2d 552, 554 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (avoiding the underlying issue of comparative negligence because the error
was harmless); State v. Martin, 761 A.2d 500, 501 (N.H. 2000) (avoiding the underlying
evidentiary issue because of harmless error); Daniel Epps, Harmless Errors and Substantial
Rights, 131 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 2-3) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (arguing that harmless error should be conceived as part of the constitutional
right, rather than as a remedy).
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terms or facing execution, the opportunity to vacate the conviction and
to start again with jury selection is one of the biggest legal victories they
could hope to achieve. Unlike at trial, going back to the beginning is not
a modest remedy with uncertain benefits. For the inmate, the restart is
exceedingly valuable, and not just as a means of delay. At trial, there may
have been numerous errors-constitutional, tactical, and otherwise-that
led to the defendant's conviction or sentence. Many of those errors may
not present winnable claims on appeal, but Batson's automatic reversal
wipes clean the entire slate and allows the defendant a coveted second
chance to defend her liberty.11 By this measure, Batson is a far more
significant victory on appeal and in habeas than at trial.119
It could be argued that any constitutional violation is more signifi-
cant on appeal than at trial. For example, a trial court would remedy a
violation of the Confrontation Clause by excluding the unconfronted
evidence or by issuing a curative instruction to the jury to ignore the evi-
dence, but these trial remedies pale in comparison to the appellate remedy
of throwing out the conviction. Does that mean the trial-post-trial
imbalance Batson demonstrates is no different from the Confrontation
Clause? No. Batson is different because its status as structural error severs
any connection between what happens on appeal and what would have
happened at trial. The appellate Batson litigant actually gets more than
she would have at trial. In the Confrontation Clause example, the defen-
dant who shows a violation at trial is able to exclude some significant
piece of evidence, and that presumably changes the likely outcome of the
defendant's case. The same theory holds on appeal: If the Confrontation
Clause violation proves significant to the outcome of the case, the
defendant gets a new trial and that piece of evidence will be excluded,
presumably giving her a better chance at victory. In the Batson example,
it is extremely unclear how the defendant would have been better off at
trial if the particular struck juror had not been struck, a point noted in
118. Karlan, Batson, supra note 57, at 397 n.77 (noting that an amicus brief in Batson
"predicted that because 'the constitutional remedy will generally occur at the trial court
level' it would 'involve little more than a new beginning to jury selection'-a relatively
small 'transactional cos[t]' for 'insuring a representative jury'" (quoting Brief of Michael
McCray et al. as Amici Curiae, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (No. 84-6263), 1985
WL 667869)).
119. Scholars have noted that the automatic-reversal remedy may make judges less
likely to acknowledge a Batson violation because they are afraid of the remedy. See Karlan,
Race, Rights, and Remedies, supra note 51, at 2015 ("What Batson shows is that when
courts cannot calibrate the remedy, they fudge on the right instead."); Steven M. Shepard,
Note, The Case Against Automatic Reversal of Structural Errors, 117 Yale LJ. 1180, 1187-
88 (2008). They suggest this would be most likely in cases in which race played no obvious
role in the case-such as ones in which prosecutors did not make racially charged state-
ments to the jury or when the underlying facts of the crime do not implicate racial ten-
sions. In such cases, a Batson win would seem like a windfall. See Karlan, Race, Rights, and
Remedies, supra, at 2022 ("By contrast, in cases without an obvious racial salience, trial
judges may view Batson objections as attempts to set up grounds for per se reversal and
thus may accept somewhat dubious prosecutorial explanations.... ").
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more depth above.1 20 But the appellate Batson litigant clearly benefits
from the full reversal, even without showing that the struck jurors would
have affected the outcome of her case. This distinction makes the trial-
post-trial gap in Batson more significant than in other constitutional
doctrines.
21
B. Difference in Evidence Between Trial and Post-Trial Proceedings
A further manifestation of the divide between trial and appellate Batson
can be seen in the way in which habeas litigants use types of evidence
that are not available to them at trial. Batson is even more expansive in
this respect than other record-expanding habeas doctrines, like Brady v.
Maryland12 2 and Strickland v. Washington.12 Because of Batson's focus on
the prosecutor's intent, a surprisingly wide range of evidence becomes
relevant-even evidence that was not in existence at the time of trial.
This section discusses several types of evidence and analytical meth-
ods that are not available at trial but are available later on. Because much
of the discussion concerns extra-record evidence, a brief definition of re-
cord and extra-record evidence is useful. Batson is often considered a
record-based doctrine.124 The evidence needed for a Batson claim typically
comes from the record of the defendant's case: the jurors' question-
naires and the transcripts of voir dire and the peremptory strikes. There
is no need to conduct any research from outside of the case-research
that would yield extra-record information.125 Indeed, this was one of
120. See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
121. One important caveat, of course, is that the "victorious" appellate defendant can
still be retried. So one might argue that this appellate win, in all its drama, still only
restores the defendant to the position she would have occupied had she won at trial. An
obvious rejoinder, however, is that retrying someone years after the initial conviction is no
easy feat and may benefit the defendant.
122. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that "the suppression by the prosecution of evi-
dence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution").
123. 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984) (articulating "the general standards for judging ineffec-
tiveness claims").
124. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Johnson v. California, 541 U.S. 428
(2004) (No. 03-6539), 2004 WL 5607668 ("[T]he res gestae takes place in front of the
court. It takes place in front of the parties therefore. Everything that that party needs is
available to the party."); Matthew Seligman, Note, Harrington's Wake: Unanswered
Questions on AEDPA's Application to Summary Dispositions, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 469, 485-86
(2012) ("A paradigmatic record-based claim is a Batson claim .... All the evidence re-
quired to make out a Batson claim will be contained in the trial record-the prosecution's
use of peremptory challenges, the race of the prospective jurors, any race-neutral expla-
nation for the peremptory challenges .... and so on.").
125. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44,Johnson, 541 U.S. 428 (No. 03-6539), 2004 WL
5607668.
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Batson's chief innovations over Swain; it relieved defendants of the need
to research the prosecutor's behavior in other cases.'
2 6
Even though Batson does not require the defendant to look beyond
the record of the case, it also does not prevent her from doing so if there
is extra-record evidence that reflects the prosecutor's bias. This extra-
record evidence can consist of the prosecutor's Batson violations in other
cases, or the prosecutor's racist comments in the media, or internal office
policies that promote racial discrimination-anything that speaks to the
prosecutor's intent. Another meaning of extra-record evidence is evi-
dence that may relate to the defendant's own case, but was not part of the
record of the case at trial. A prime example can be seen in the prose-
cutor's notes from jury selection. These notes may be unavailable at trial
insofar as they are considered privileged work product, yet they may be-
come available to the defendant after trial in postconviction proceedings.
As this section shows, extra-record evidence has become increasingly
important to Batson. As prosecutors grow more adept at producing sani-
tized justifications for their strikes at step two of Batson, extra-record evi-
dence of the prosecutor's discriminatory intent is increasingly important
in winning Batson claims. What is particularly significant, for purposes of
this Article, is the way in which this extra-record Batson evidence has
made a greater impact on post-trial litigation. Even though trial litigants
are capable of incorporating most-but not all-types of extra-record evi-
dence into their cases, the extra-record evidence and analytical methods
described here remain largely a tool of postconviction and appellate Batson.
This divergence provides another example of the split between Batson
trial and post-trial practice.
1. Jury-Selection Notes. - There is no better evidence of a prosecu-
tor's intent than her notes from jury selection. A number of significant
Batson opinions-including the Supreme Court's recent decision in Foster
v. Chatman127--have used these jury-selection notes to demonstrate the
prosecutor's bias. But there is a significant difference in the availability of
these notes at trial compared to in postconviction proceedings.
In Foster v. Chatman, the prosecutor's jury-selection notes showed
that race was a dominant factor in jury selection, despite the prosecu-
tion's repeated assertions to the contrary.128 At trial, Foster asked for the
notes, but the prosecutor refused to turn them over, and the court did
not force the issue.1"9 When the notes came out years later in postconvic-
tion proceedings, they showed that the prosecutor had targeted jurors
126. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
127. 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1755 (2016).
128. Id. at 1743-44, 1754-55.
129. Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Foster, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (No. 14-8349), 2015 WL
6694912 ("[T]he defense lawyers at trial did move for the prosecution's notes. And the
prosecution opposed that. They're very strict in not-not giving up their notes.").
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because of race.13° For example, the notes contained the letter "B" next
to the names of all the African American jurors-names that the prosecutor
had highlighted in green pen.131 The notes also showed that all five of
the venire's qualified black prospective jurors made it onto the prosecu-
tor's list of the six least acceptable prospective jurors.1 32 Three decades
after the trial, the jury-selection notes revealed the prosecutor's obsession
with race and led the Supreme Court to throw out the defendant's
conviction.'
33
In a number of other cases from the Supreme Court, the lower fed-
eral courts, and the states, jury-selection notes have also played a role in
showing grotesquely racist practices injury selection.T' In a notable deci-
sion by District Judge Lucy Koh, the notes revealed such attentiveness to
race that the prosecutor struck white jurors because one was "interest[ed]
in African American culture and had written a book on African American
folklore" and another's answers to voir dire questions suggested she
might be married to a black man.135 By the same token, prosecutors have
used jury-selection notes to defend themselves against Batson allegations
when the notes show nondiscriminatory reasons for their strikes.
136
The difference between trial and habeas access to the notes is sig-
nificant. At trial, the prosecutor's notes are generally protected from
130. Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1743-44, 1754-55.
131. Id. at 1744.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1755.
134. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 266 (2005) (finding that the
prosecutors noted the race of prospective jurors in an attempt to avoid impaneling
minorities); see also Shirley v. Yates, 807 F.3d 1090, 1106 n.16 (9th Cir. 2015) ("Another
category of circumstantial evidence not available in this case-contemporaneous notes-
may provide far stronger evidence that an asserted reason in fact motivated the strike of a
long-since-forgotten veniremember."); In re Freeman, 133 P.3d 1013, 1018 (Cal. 2006)
(noting the use of the prosecutor's notes to corroborate testimony that he exercised three
peremptory challenges because he believed the prospective jurors were Jewish).
135. Mitcham v. Davis, 103 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (granting habeas
relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to raise what likely would
have been a winning objection under Wheeler, a state law analogue of Batson).
136. See, e.g., Adkins v. Warden, 710 F.3d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining
that jury-selection notes help the prosecutor explain his strikes in a nondiscriminatory
way); United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 128 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that the prose-
cutor submitted his notes to the judge in camera to rebut the defendant's prima facie case
of discrimination); McCrory v. Henderson, 871 F. Supp. 597, 601 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (allow-
ing the prosecutor to use notes on remand to try to provide a neutral justification at Batson
step two for his peremptory strikes), rev'd on other grounds, 82 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1996);
Transcript of Oral Argument passim, State v. Osorio, 973 A.2d 365 (N.J. 2009) (No. A-59-
08), 2009 WL 2703124. But cf. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, United States v.
Stephens, 514 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-2892), 2007 WL 5514343 ("JUDGE: Yeah,
but wouldn't it be surprising if a prosecutor's notes would be considered determinative of
a challenge? ... [I]fyou were someone who really was biased or prejudiced which I would




disclosure under the work-product privilege, based on the theory that the
notes reflect the prosecutor's thinking about tactics and strategy for liti-
gating the case.13 7 Defendants generally do not ask for prosecutors' notes
mid-trial. Nor would courts be likely to grant such requests.13 8 In postcon-
viction proceedings, however, there is a different approach to the notes.
Prosecutors may continue to assert that the notes are privileged work
product, or they may claim that the notes do not properly fall within the
scope of any postconviction discovery right. In many cases, though, the
notes wind up being disclosed to the defendant on habeas review, because
there is simply less justification for protecting the prosecutor's strategy
and tactics once the trial has already run its course. The disclosure of the
notes to the defense sometimes comes about voluntarily.139 Often, the
district attorney's office is no longer representing the prosecution in ha-
beas proceedings, and the new agency handling the case-likely the state
attorney general's office-may have less investment in the notes' secrecy.
Another avenue to accessing the notes is postconviction-discovery lit-
igation. In these discovery proceedings, a state or federal judge must
determine whether there has been a sufficient showing to entitle the de-
fendant to access the notes. A range of views exists on what is necessary to
trigger disclosure, and some courts have created special carve-outs for
when the notes must be disclosed, as in instances when the prosecutor
137. Some courts hold the notes are privileged. See Ted A. Donner & Richard K.
Gabriel, Jury Selection Strategy and Science § 3:7, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2016)
("A number of courts have likewise found that counsel's notes, taken during the voir dire,
should not be subject to production during a Batson hearing because they constitute
attorney work product."); see also People v. Trujillo, 15 P.3d 1104, 1107-08 (Colo. App.
2000). For examples of other cases in which the prosecutor's notes were held to be privi-
leged, see Foster v. State, 374 S.E.2d 188, 192 (Ga. 1988); People v. Mack, 538 N.E.2d
1107, 1115-16 (Ill. 1989); Thorson v. State, 721 So. 2d 590, 595-96 (Miss. 1998); State v.
Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 67 (Mo. 1987); Guilder v. State, 794 S.W.2d 765, 767-68 (Tex.
App. 1990).
138. This is not to say that a judge would be powerless under Batson to order such
disclosure. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
139. In one remarkable case, a prosecutor disclosed the notes during the direct appeal
upon discovering what the trial prosecutor had written in them. United States v. Baskerville,
No. 03-836 (JAP), 2011 WL 159782, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 18, 2011) (noting that the
government voluntarily moved for remand on direct appeal when the new prosecutor
discovered the original prosecutor's notes); Appellant William Baskerville's First Step
Supplemental Brief on Appeal & Supplemental Appendix at *23, United States v.
Baskerville, 448 Fed. App'x 243 (3d Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-1175, 07-2927), 2011 WL 858744
("The prosecutors' voir dire notes show that white jurors who had friends or family who
served time in prison were graded 'Excellent' and 'Very Good' while black jurors with 'bad
apple' relatives were graded 'Strike' or 'Good.'"); see also Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct.
1737, 1743-44 (2016) (explaining that the notes were turned over pursuant to a state pub-
lic records act request); Majid v. Portuondo, 428 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) (describing
in camera review of the prosecutor's notes on remand); id. at 119 (noting that the pro-
secutor voluntarily provided voir dire notes to the defense on remand); Mitcham, 103 F.
Supp. 3d at 1097 (turning over notes in postconviction proceedings). There is also the
practical reality that the attorney representing the government on appeal will often not be
the same as the trial attorney, so her personal interests in the privilege may be lessened.
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used her notes at trial to refresh her recollection of the strikes.14 A popular
way to balance the Batson and work-product interests in the notes is to
have the court review them in camera to determine whether they contain
any support for a Batson claim.'4 ' Rounding out this brief survey of dis-
closure procedures is the example of the federal judge who ordered the
notes disclosed in postconviction proceedings because, in his view, the
work-product privilege cannot be used to conceal racial discrimination.
142
Amidst a jumble of conflicting rules about when a defendant may
access the notes, the key point is that the notes are much more accessible
post-trial than during trial. This is significant because the prosecutor's
notes are the best evidence of her intent, yet the notes are stuck in a legal
limbo. No one denies their importance to resolving Batson claims, but they
remain beyond the defendant's grasp at trial. It is only in post-trial pro-
ceedings that they may become available to the defendant. This gap in
access to the notes provides one striking example of the divergence be-
tween trial and post-trial Batson.
2. The Prosecutor's Behavior in Other Cases and Outside of Court. - The
prosecutor's behavior in other cases or outside of court is another exam-
ple of extra-record evidence used in post-trial proceedings but largely
absent from Batson trial litigation. If a prosecutor has violated Batson in
one case, that violation can be proof of her bias in other Batson cases.
143
140. See, e.g., Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 449 (Tex. 1997) ("We hold that an
Edmonson movant has the right to examine the voir dire notes of the opponent's attorney
when the attorney relies upon these notes while giving sworn or unsworn testimony in the
Edmonson hearing."); see also Guilder, 794 S.W.2d at 772-73 ("[N]owhere in his brief does
appellant tell us that the prosecutor-witness used his notes to refresh his memory for the
purposes of testifying. Indeed, appellant nowhere raises the admissibility of the prose-
cutor's notes under [this rule]."); 4 Gregory B. Butler, Duncan Ross MacKay, Ann H.
Rubin & Jason R. Gagnon, Successful Partnering Between Inside and Outside Counsel
§ 64:34 n.3, Westlaw (database updated May 2017) (discussing how notes, such as a "jury
consultant's report," may have to be disclosed if the prosecutor relied on them "to refresh
his or her recollection as to the basis of a peremptory challenge").
141. In a number of cases, notes are disclosed in camera. See Harris v. Haeberlin, 752
F.3d 1054, 1057 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that the district court, on habeas remand, re-
viewed the prosecutors' notes); Tindle, 860 F.2d at 128; United States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d
103, 105 (4th Cir. 1988); Gibson v. Wetzel, No. 11-4550, 2016 WL 1273626, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 31, 2016).
142. Courts have also held that there is no privilege over intentional discrimination.
Johnson v. Finn, Nos. CIV S-03-2063 RBB JFM P, CIV S-04-2208 RBB JFM P, 2007 WL
3232253, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2007) (holding there is no work-product privilege
when it comes to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and therefore ordering
discovery).
143. Madison v. Comm'r, 761 F.3d 1240, 1252 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting "the Mobile
County District Attorney's Office's well-documented history of racially discriminatory jury
selection, including at Mr. Madison's first trial"); Hightower v. Terry, 459 F.3d 1067, 1078
(11th Cir. 2006) ("Here, Briley himself authored a memorandum that spelled out the
scheme to limit the number of blacks in the jury pool."); Rizo v. Kernan, Nos. EDCV 03-
787-JAK (AJW), EDCV 03-822-JAK (AJW), EDCV 03-824-JAK (AJW), EDCV 03-901-JAK
(AJW), 2016 WL 8606275, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2016), adopted by No. EDCV-03-787
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The same is true of the prosecutor's discriminatory statements or actions.
Although these instances of discrimination occur outside the four cor-
ners of the defendant's case, they show the prosecutor's bias. But, for
reasons discussed below, this type of evidence is embraced more in post-
conviction proceedings than at trial, thus furthering the gap between
trial and appellate Batson. Indeed, there is an irony in the use of such
extra-record evidence."' It feels like Batson has taken a step toward Swain
v. Alabama, the peremptory challenge doctrine that required defendants
to investigate and describe all the prosecutor's peremptory strikes in oth-
er cases.
145
Evidence of prosecutors' misbehavior in other cases can be quite
egregious. In one example, a California prosecutor was found to have
violated Batson in the defendant's first trial and subsequent retrial.
146
When the defendant's second retrial reached the Ninth Circuit on federal
habeas review, Judge Marsha Berzon commented at oral argument that
the prosecutor's history of bias was so pervasive that she would find a
prima facie case of racial discrimination anytime the prosecutor struck a
minority juror.'47 Numerous other courts have considered a prosecutor's
behavior in other cases as evidence of discriminatory intent in the defen-
dant's particular case.148
JAK (AJW), 2017 WL 1115150 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2017) ("[T]he prosecutor was found to
have purposefully discriminated against at least one African-American prospective juror in
petitioners' first trial."); cf. People v. Howard, 824 P.2d 1315, 1326 n.4 (Cal. 1992) ("How-
ever, even if a trial court might properly consider a prosecutor's past in determining
whether a prima facie case exists, a court obviously cannot consider a prosecutor's
future.").
144. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
145. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) ("[A]lthough some false reasons
are shown up within the four corners of a given case, sometimes a court may not be sure
unless it looks beyond the case at hand. Hence Batson's explanation that a defendant may
rely on 'all relevant circumstances' to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination."
(quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (1986))); supra section I.C.1 (describing
Swain as one of Batson's antidiscrimination comparators).
146. Currie v. McDowell, 825 F.3d 603, 607-08, 610-11 (9th Cir. 2016) ("In Miller-El
v. Cockrel4 the.., fact that prosecutors belonged to a[n] ... office with a history of racial
bias... bolster[ed] [the] finding of a prima facie case. In this instance, it is not only the
same office, but the same prosecutor, who brings a history of Batson violations with him."
(citation omitted)).
147. Oral Argument at 19:00, Currie, 825 F.3d 603 (No. 13-16187), http://www.ca9.
uscourts.gov/media/view.php?pkid=0000014795 (on file with the Columbia Law Review);
cf. Brief of Appellant at 108, Flowers v. State, 158 So. 3d 1009 (Miss. 2014) (No. 2010-DP-
01348-SCT), 2013 WL 9982812 ("Here, it was not only the same office that had engaged
in discrimination in jury selection, but the same prosecutor; it was not only the same
prosecutor, but the very same case.").
148. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 347 (2003) (inferring discrimination,
in part, on the basis that the prosecutor's office had a history of discrimination); Edwards
v. Roper, 688 F.3d 449, 458 (8th Cir. 2012) (discussing evidence of seven other Batson
reversals in St. Louis County prosecutions and citing a newspaper article about a St. Louis
County prosecutor "who claimed that other attorneys advised him to strike blacks from
[Vol. 118:713
2018] BATSON 'S APPELLATE APPEAL
And it is not just Batson violations from other cases that can be used
to show a prosecutor's discriminatory intent in jury selection. Anything
the prosecutor says or does, in court or out of court, can potentially show
her bias and, thus, serve as evidence that a strike of hers was motivated by
race. An unlucky prosecutor in Kentucky, for example, was caught on a hot
mic during a court recess talking about jury selection in racial terms: "We've
got [name deleted], 49, she's the old lady, the black lady. The other one is
already off."' 49 The recording was discovered soon after the defendant's
conviction and made part of the record to be considered on the direct
appeal.
1 50
Racist comments made in closing argument provide other examples
of evidence relevant to the Batson inquiry because they, again, reflect the
prosecutor's bias.15' The same is true of racist comments in the press, civil
judgments for discriminatory employment practices, and membership in
the Ku Klux Klan.152 All of this is relevant to the Batson claim insofar as it
shows the prosecutor's bias.
153
juries"); Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 265 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding evidence of
bias in the prosecutor's statement to defense counsel, outside of court, that the de-
fendant's first jury had hung "only because of a sympathetic Black juror"); Michelle May,
Cent. Cal. Appellate Program, How to Make a Batson Case on Appeal 29, http://
www.capcentral.org/criminal/articles/docs/Batson-part2.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (noting that "evidence of the prosecutor's peremptory challenges in other
cases-or the DA's office's policies or actions in other cases" may be present in the record
and, if it is, can be used as "a factor supporting a third-stage Batson showing").
149. Harris v. Haeberlin, 752 F.3d 1054, 1056 (6th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added by
Harris) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harris v. Haeberlin, 526 F.3d 903,
907 (6th Cir. 2008)).
150. Harris, 526 F.3d at 913; see also Harris, 752 F.3d at 1056.
151. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22, Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737
(2016) (No. 14-8349), 2015 WL 2457657.
152. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21-22, Dressner v. Louisiana, 562 U.S.
1271 (2011) (No. 10-752), 2010 WL 4959741 ("[T]he prosecutors in this case were the
very same ones that amici identified in Snyder who wore neckties depicting a hangman's
noose and a grim reaper in death penalty proceedings."); see also Brief of Nine Jefferson
Parish Ministers as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13-14, Snyder v. Louisiana, 552
U.S. 472 (2008) (No. 06-10119), 2007 WL 2605448 (citingJeffrey Gettleman, Prosecutors'
Morbid Neckties Stir Criticism, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 2003, at A14); Sheri Lynn Johnson et
al., Racial Epithets in the Criminal Process, 2011 Mich. St. L. Rev. 755, 782 ("[A] prosecu-
tor's use of a racial epithet could be probative of his racial motivation in striking a minor-
ity race juror.").
153. At the same time, extra-record evidence about the prosecutor's past can some-
times help her defend against claims of bias. A judge's experience with the prosecutor-
whether in previous cases or socially-can serve as evidence that the prosecutor did not
harbor bias and was not guilty of a Batson violation. See Alaska Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Avis
Budget Grp., 738 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that the judge and opposing
counsel "both expressed their confidence that Avis's lawyer was not racially motivated");
Adkins v. Warden, 710 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 2013) (showing how the judge invoked
his "own personal experience with the prosecutor in other cases" to find the prosecutor's
nondiscriminatory explanations to be credible).
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A detailed illustration of this extra-record evidence can be seen in
the Supreme Court's 2008 decision Snyder v. Louisiana.5 4 In that case,
nine local ministers filed an amicus brief cataloguing the many Batson
violations that the prosecutor's office committed.155 And Batson violations
were only the start. The amicus brief provided statistics on the racial use
of peremptories in a dozen other capital prosecutions in the office 156 and
presented the Justices with examples of racially offensive statements that
the trial prosecutor and a colleague made to a journalist in a joint inter-
view-statements that referred to "black on black" murder and "white
man's justice" and joked about seating "Nazis on capital juries."'157 The
brief further recounted that the trial prosecutor's office displayed "a tiny
model electric chair holding cut-out faces of five African-American con-
demned men,"'' 5 8 and that the prosecutors in the office had "appeared in
capital courtroom proceedings with neckties depicting a grim reaper and
a hangman's noose."15 9 With one example after another, the brief showed
how extra-record evidence can be used to demonstrate the prosecutor's
discriminatory intent.
What must again be emphasized, for purposes of this Article, is that
the use of this type of extra-record evidence is a greater part of Batson
habeas litigation than Batson trial litigation. This is in part a practical
matter. Trial attorneys are more likely to plead Batson claims on the fly,
typically without thoroughly searching the prosecutor's history of dis-
crimination in other cases. At trial, given the time constraints and the
relatively modest value of winning a trial Batson claim, litigators may feel
their time is better spent on other areas of the case. Appellate litigants,
on the other hand, are well equipped to conduct the type of record col-
lection and investigation that is required to develop such extra-record
evidence. And the enormous benefit of a Batson appellate victory pro-
vides an incentive to vigorously pursue such claims.
There is another practical consideration related to the divergence
between trial and post-trial use of this type of extra-record evidence:
Some of the evidence may not come into existence until after the de-
fendant's trial. Maybe the prosecutorjoined the Ku Klux Klan shortly after
the defendant's conviction. Maybe the prosecutor earned a number of
Batson reversals in the years between the defendant's conviction and the
defendant's postconviction proceedings. Obviously, trial counsel cannot
use evidence that is not in existence at the time, but the postconviction
proceedings happen so long after the trial that there is a lot of time for
154. 552 U.S. at 472-73.
155. Brief of Nine Jefferson Parish Ministers as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
supra note 152, at 7-10.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ivan Solotaroff, The Last
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this new evidence to come into existence. As will be described in more
depth later on, 16° it is Batson's focus on the prosecutor's intent that makes
such late-arising, extra-record evidence relevant to the claim.
161
Litigation style may also explain why extra-record evidence takes on
greater importance post-trial than at trial. At trial, a defense attorney
must stand in the presence of the prosecutor-perhaps even a prosecu-
tor she will have to work with on a regular basis-and accuse the
prosecutor of racial discrimination. If the defense attorney begins to
bring in evidence of the prosecutor's racism from far and wide, the accu-
sations become more and more characterological: It is not just that the
prosecutor allowed race to influence this particular strike, but rather, the
prosecutor has a racist character. Such broad accusations about the char-
acter of the prosecutor are relevant to the Batson claim, of course, but
many commentators have noted that defense attorneys may still find it
awkward to make these accusations.
162
Appellate litigation, on the other hand, has a different flavor. The
appellate proceedings are carried out mostly on paper, which gives them
a more impersonal feel. And, as mentioned earlier, the trial prosecutor is
likely not even the attorney representing the state on appeal.63 Because
of this dynamic, it may be easier for the appellate attorney to present a
detailed history of the prosecutor's racial prejudice.
Regardless of the precise reason, the difference between the trial
and post-trial use of this extra-record evidence is significant in creating a
gap between the two sides of the Batson doctrine.
3. Policies, Trainings, and Internal Memos. - Internal manuals, train-
ing materials, and office policies provide still another category of extra-
record material that can be used to show the prosecutor's intent."6 This
type of evidence has been part ofjury-selection litigation going all the way
back to Swain. Just as with the jury-selection notes, these materials are
considered powerful, probative evidence, but there is little clarity about
when a litigant is entitled to them. The recurring theme, however, is that
appellate litigants have easier access to these materials than do trial litigants.
160. See infra section III.C.1.
161. Cf. Stephen B. Bright & Katherine Chamblee, Litigating Race Discrimination
Under Batson v. Kentucky, Crim. Just., Spring 2017, at 10, 11-12 (recommending the devel-
opment of a "database to track the strikes of black jurors across cases" because "[w] hen
prosecutors have discriminated in one case, chances are they have discriminated in many
others... [and] it is much harder to explain a well-defined pattern of disproportionate
strikes across cases"). A declaration from the prosecutor about her own prior practices is
also relevant. See In re Freeman, 133 P.3d 1013, 1015 (Cal. 2006) ("One time... Judge
Golde called me into chambers and asked rhetorically 'Quatman, what are you doing?' ...
He said I could not have a Jew on the jury .... (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting declaration of former prosecutorJohn R. Quatman)).
162. Cf. supra note 35 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Cochran v. Herring, 43 F.3d 1404, 1412 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting prose-
cutors' informal policy of striking jurors based on race).
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In Miller-El v. Dretke, the fact that the prosecutors' files contained the
Sparling Manual was evidence that "race was on their minds when they
considered every potential juror. "165 The Sparling Manual proved important
in Miller-El and other Texas cases because the manual explicitly in-
structed prosecutors on how to misuse race in jury selection."6 Miller-El
also included testimony from a former Dallas prosecutor who was told by
a superior that if he allowed an African American on his jury he would be
fired.
167
The Philadelphia District Attorney's Office provides yet another ex-
ample of how internal trainings can be used to show a prosecutor's racist
intent. There, a prosecutor was caught in a taped training session ex-
plaining to other prosecutors how to remove African Americans--especially
African American women-from the jury.168 The training came replete
with instructions on how to avoid being caught by Batson.169 Similarly,
North Carolina prosecutors allegedly took part in a "Top Gun" training
academy "where they provided a cheat sheet of pat, 'race-neutral' expla-
nations" for Batson challenges, according to a publication by one ACLU
lawyer.17 The list of attendees and the contents of the training have since
165. 545 U.S. 231, 266 (2005); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 334-35
(2003) (explaining the District Attorney's Office instructed prosecutors to use peremptory
strikes against minorities ("Do not take Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a member of
any minority") and distributed a manual entitled Jury Selection in a Criminal Case with an
article "outlining the reasoning for excluding minorities from jury service"); Reed v.
Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364, 382 (5th Cir. 2009) ("The Court in Miller-El II relied, in part,
on the Sparling Manual to glean the history of racial discrimination in the Dallas County
District Attorney's Office, and Reed presented this same document at his Batson hear-
ing."). The same was true in Tucker v. Thomas, in which postconviction counsel discovered
a manual in the prosecutor's file showing how to justify peremptory strikes in race-neutral
ways. See First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 40, Tucker v. Thomas, No.
1:07-CV-868, 2017 WL 4011249 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 11, 2017).
166. See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 266 (explaining that the "prosecutors took their cues
from a 20-year-old manual of tips on jury selection" that put an "emphasis on race").
167. Id. at 264. The claim in Miller-El was pleaded at trial as a Swain claim because the
trial took place before Batson was decided. Id. at 263.
168. See Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 655 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing videotaped
training of Assistant District Attorney Jack McMahon discussing race-based techniques for
jury selection); Watkins v. Klopotoski, No. 08-5802, 2009 WL 6593918, at *4 n.4 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 11, 2009) ("[T]he Third Circuit determined that the now infamous McMahon tape,
which depicted Philadelphia ADAJack McMahon advocating the use of peremptory strikes
against African American jurors in 1987, provided insight into McMahon's own motivation
for striking black jurors during his prosecution of a petitioner in 1984."), adopted by No.
08-5802, 2010 WL 2431610 (E.D. Pa.June 14, 2010).
169. Wilson, 426 F.3d at 658. Significantly, the timing of the video's release suggests
that it was disclosed for political reasons rather than out of any particular fealty to equal
protection. Id. at 656.
170. Cassandra Stubbs, ACLU Capital Punishment Project, Strengthening Batson
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been distributed within the criminal defense bar to assist in showing
attendees' bias.
17'
In the context of the gap between trial and post-trial Batson, it is im-
portant to point out that these internal materials are frequently consid-
ered privileged work product and can be difficult to obtain at trial. To
the extent that they are obtained and used in Batson cases, it is usually by
postconviction litigants. When these policies, trainings, and manuals come
to light, it is often through leaks rather than discovery or public records
requests.172 And the fact that the office-wide materials apply to so many
prosecutors in the office means that once these manuals and trainings
are leaked to one defendant, they are likely to spread to many others as
well. In this way, a trickle of information in one case can turn into a
torrent of postconviction claims in other cases, as defendants who were
prosecuted by the same offending prosecutor or prosecutor's office learn
of them.
4. Comparative Juror Analysis. - The next example of divergent evi-
dence between trial and post-trial proceedings is conceptually quite
different. Here, this Article considers an analytical tool-comparative juror
analysis-that is a mainstay of Batson appellate litigation but that is not
practically deployable at trial. Comparative juror analysis draws compar-
isons between those jurors who were struck and those who were seated.
173
The purpose of the comparisons is to determine whether the prosecu-
tor's stated reasons for striking a particular juror hold up across the
entire venire.174 If they do not, that is a sign that the justification for the
particular strike may be false. For example, if a prosecutor struck a black
juror on the grounds that the juror lacked a college degree, one would
expect the prosecutor to strike white jurors who lacked college degrees.
If she did not strike white jurors without college degrees, that suggests
171. See id.
172. See supra note 169 and accompanying text; see also supra note 137 and
accompanying text (providing several examples of the trial prosecutor's notes being
disclosed voluntarily).
173. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005) ("If a prosecutor's proffered
reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack
who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to
be considered at Batson's third step."); United States v. Barnette, 644 F.3d 192, 201-02
(4th Cir. 2011) (considering a comparative-juror-analysis challenge to jury selection);
Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 956 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Comparative juror analysis is an
established tool at step three of the Batson analysis for determining whether facially race-
neutral reasons are a pretext for discrimination.").
174. There are variations on this that this Article does not discuss in any depth here.
Sometimes, the comparison group may not be seated jurors but rather jurors whom the
prosecutor did not strike and who did not make it onto the panel (because, perhaps, the
defendant struck them or the jury was accepted by both sides before those jurors came
into the box). See, e.g., People v. Lomax, 234 P.3d 377, 411 n.14 (Cal. 2010) ("In general,
a comparative juror analysis 'compares panelists who were struck with those who were
allowed to serve or were passed by the prosecution before being ultimately struck by the
defense.'" (quoting People v. Lenix, 187 P.3d 946, 967 (Cal. 2008))).
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the demand for a college degree was a pretext and the true motivation
for the strike was something else, perhaps race.
Because jurors typically differ on more than one dimension, compar-
ative juror analysis can become quite complicated and time consuming.
A careful reading of the jurors' questionnaires and voir dire answers is
required to create the appropriate comparisons. The process is akin to
multivariable regression analysis; litigants attempt to show that the two
jurors being compared are largely similar except for one salient
characteristic: race.175 If the juror's race begins to look like the best
predictor of the prosecutor's strikes, that is powerful evidence of racial
discrimination.
The point worth emphasizing is comparative juror analysis's relative
prominence post-trial as compared to at trial. 17 6 Unlike the extra-record
evidence mentioned above, the inputs for comparative juror analysis are
all accessible to the parties at the time of trial. The juror questionnaires,
the voir dire transcript, and the transcript of the prosecutor's strikes pro-
vide the data that are used to compare the jurors. 77 But trial attorneys
are not really in a position to use this information for the type of in-depth
comparisons that are routine on appeal.17 This is not simply a matter of
trial attorneys' time limitations. 79 A bigger problem is that Batson chal-
lenges are generally brought in the midst of jury selection, and at that
time no one knows which jurors will end up on the panel and which will
ultimately be struck. Without knowing the identities of the seated jurors-
or the identities of all the struck jurors-the parties cannot effectively
compare those who were seated with those were struck in the way that
comparative juror analysis typically envisions.180 This is a further reason
175. See Barnette, 644 F.3d at 201-02 (rejecting a comparative-juror-analysis challenge
because the defendant did not adequately account for possible factors other than race).
176. Case law in many jurisdictions requires appellate courts to perform comparative
juror analysis in evaluating Batson claims. Grossman, supra note 40, at 12 ("Federal courts
have concluded that in order to determine if the prosecutor's reasons were pretextual, a
comparative analysis is appropriate."); see also People v. Gutierrez, 395 P.3d 186, 204 (Cal.
2017) (LiuJ., concurring) ("[C] omparative juror analysis is an important tool in ferreting
out improper discrimination, and the mandate to consider all relevant circumstances
means a court must undertake comparative juror analysis even if it is raised for the first
time on appeal." (citations omitted)).
177. Sometimes, however, the race of the jurors is not actually recorded in the record
on appeal. See, e.g., Williams v. Beard, 637 F.3d 195, 214 (3d Cir. 2011).
178. This is true even if trial courts are nominally required to perform the analysis. See
Shirley v. Yates, 807 F.3d 1090, 1102 n.9 (9th Cir. 2015); Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139,
1149 (9th Cir. 2006); Lenix, 187 P.3d at 961. It is not clear how such analysis can really be
done at trial. See Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364, 369-70 (5th Cir. 2009) (discussing
comparative juror analysis on appeal and whether it should be procedurally barred
because it was not raised at trial).
179. See supra section II.B.2.
180. Comparisons are not impossible, and some attorneys will point out comparisons
among strikes-in the midst of voir dire-even though the final twelve jurors still have not
been selected. E.g., People v. Crittenden, 885 P.2d 887, 903 (Cal. 1994) (noting a trial
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that comparative juror analysis, a critical tool of post-trial Batson, is not as
significant at trial.
Granted, Batson challenges can be raised at the very end of jury se-
lection or even on a motion for a new trial, and in such instances the
identities of the seated jurors would be known.' But such delayed Batson
challenges are unusual,1 8 2 so the point remains: Comparative juror analy-
sis, though a powerful tool for showing discriminatory intent, is largely
an appellate-only'83 method of analysis. This discrepancy widens the fis-
sure between Batson claims at trial and Batson claims on appeal.
5. Batson Reconstruction Hearings. - Batson "reconstruction" hear-
ings provide another example of how the trial and post-trial sides of
Batson diverge. Reconstruction hearings have not been discussed in the




Here's how they often come about: At trial, the defendant makes a Batson
objection, and the trial judge finds no prima facie case of discrimina-
tion.l8 5 As a result, the prosecutor is never asked to put his justifications
for the strike on the record.18 6 Years later, an appellate court disagrees
with the trial judge's assessment and finds that the defendant did state a
prima facie case of discrimination.8 7 The problem emerges that no one
knows what the prosecutor's justification was for the strike because she
was never asked to offer one. Without knowing that justification, the
Batson inquiry cannot move forward. For years, appellate courts would
solve this problem by reviewing the record and guessing at what could
have been the prosecutor's reasons for the strike. The courts would then
attorney's fifty-juror comparison); Oral Argument at 16:10, United States v. Moore, 770
F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-10464), http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view.php?
pkjid=0000013405 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (recounting the juror-to-juror
comparisons made at trial).
181. See, e.g., Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1743 (2016) (mentioning a Batson
challenge that was raised again in a new-trial motion); McCurdy v. Montgomery Cty., 240
F.3d 512, 522 (6th Cir. 2001) (same). The timing of peremptory challenges is also flexible,
with some jurisdictions allowing "backstrikes," for example. Bruce Hamilton, Note, Bias,
Batson, and "Backstrikes": Snyder v. Louisiana Through a Glass, Starkly, 70 La. L. Rev. 963,
964 n.8 (2010) ("A backstrike is a type of peremptory challenge used to strike jurors after
they have been accepted onto the jury panel but before the panel has been sworn.").
182. See Majid v. Portuondo, 428 F.3d 112, 127 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Batson hearings are
typically conducted in association with, and at the same time as, jury selection.").
183. In this context, "appellate" also includes "postconviction" claims.
184. See, e.g., Madison v. Comm'r, 761 F.3d 1240, 1244 (11th Cir. 2014); Crittenden v.
Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 957-58 (9th Cir. 2010); Paulino v. Harrison, 542 F.3d 692, 695-96
(9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015, 1045 n.40 (11th Cir.
2005); Green v. Travis, 414 F.3d 288, 300 (2d Cir. 2005); Pruitt v. McAdory, 337 F.3d 921,
929 (7th Cir. 2003).
185. See Pruitt, 337 F.3d at 927-28.
186. See id. at 928-29.
187. See id. at 928.
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evaluate these imagined reasons at step three to see whether the prima
facie case of discrimination was rebutted.
1 88
This practice of conjuring up reasons ran into conflict with the
Supreme Court's demand that the Batson inquiry seek out "actual an-
swers" and "real reasons" for the strike-not just speculation. As the
Court held in Johnson v. California, "[I] t does not matter that the prose-
cutor might have had good reasons... [;] [w]ihat matters is the real rea-
son they were stricken."18 9 The reconstruction hearings were created as a
way to produce these actual answers by reconstructing step two in a live
evidentiary hearing."° To get the actual reasons for the strike, the
prosecutor is called to the stand and asked about the strike or strikes.19'
Simple as this sounds, the hearings have become very complicated,
and they require a suspension of disbelief. Even though the hearings are
supposed to reconstruct the trial proceedings, they actually diverge from
trial practice in many significant ways. One divergence is that, unlike at
trial, the prosecutor testifies as a sworn witness at the reconstruction
hearing, and his testimony is subject to cross-examination.92 Another
divergence involves the question of the prosecutor's ability to remember
her reasons for the strike.193 At trial, there is no question that the prose-
cutor is capable of remembering her true reasons. Even if she cannot
recall the answer off the top of her head, she can consult her notes. On
the contrary, in the reconstruction hearings, there are grave doubts
about whether the prosecutor has any true memory of why she struck the
188. See Paulino, 542 F.3d at 700. Another option for the federal court is to grant a
conditional writ and allow the state court to hold a hearing itself. Brian R. Means, Federal
Habeas Manual § 13:13, Westlaw (database updated May 2017).
189. 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2004)).
190. Grossman, supra note 40, at 16 (critiquing the process of remanding cases for
prosecutors to state the reason for a peremptory challenge because it is "nearly impossible
for the prosecutor to genuinely remember the real reason" and the prosecutor may "try[l
to invent more legitimate reasons after the fact").
191. Shirley v. Yates, 807 F.3d 1090, 1097-100 (9th Cir. 2015); Paulino, 542 F.3d at 701.
192. This is more common than one would think. In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the California Supreme Court's case law was demanding too much from litigants
at step one. As a result, numerous California trial courts were improperly rejecting Batson
claims at step one. See Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171.
193. See Green v. Travis, 414 F.3d 288, 293 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[T]he trial prosecutor...
had little to no independent recollection of the characteristics or comments of any of the
venirepersons at petitioner's trial."); Simmons v. Beyer, 44 F.3d 1160, 1167 (3d Cir. 1995)
("By the time of the reconstruction hearings, eleven years after Simmons' trial, defense
counsel did not recall how many African Americans were in the venire, how many were
struck by the prosecution, or how many were seated as jurors.... The assistant prosecutor
similarly did not remember.... ."). But see Harris v. Haeberlin, 752 F.3d 1054, 1059 (6th
Cir. 2014) ("Because circumstantial evidence may support a district court's finding of
intent, it is possible to reconstruct a meaningful Batson hearing even in the absence of a
prosecutor's independent recollection of his motives for making the challenged strike.").
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juror.19 4 Years or even decades may have passed since the strike. If the
prosecutor has no notes of the strikes, she may have no way of refreshing
her recollection. Even if the prosecutor has a memory of why she struck
the juror, her memory may have been influenced by review of the voir
dire transcript prior to the reconstruction hearing or by discussions the
prosecutor had in preparation for the hearing. In other words, there are
grave reasons to doubt that the answer provided by the prosecutor is the
real reason, yet the reconstruction hearing treats the answer as if the
prosecutor had said it in real time during the trial. 9 '
In many ways, the reconstruction hearing is a manifestation of
Batson's appellate ambitiousness. Batson's strict adherence to its three-
part framework, and its insistence on finding the actual reasons for the
strikes, fuel the notion that the reasons for the strikes can be recon-
structed so long after the trial simply by putting the prosecutor on the
stand. In effect, the prosecutor is allowed to do what the appellate courts
were prohibited from doing: hypothesize a reason for the strikes years
after the fact. The reconstruction hearings provide yet another way in
which post-trial Batson has expanded beyond the bounds of the trial
doctrine.
194. See Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171 n.6 (stating a prosecutor's refusal to justify making a
strike after a court's request for justification would support the inference of discrimination
for the defendant in making a prima facie case); Yee v. Duncan, 463 F.3d 893, 899-900
(9th Cir. 2006) (finding criticism of the trial court's consideration of circumstantial evi-
dence misplaced because "demand ing] trial courts to ignore evidence of the prosecutor's
'real' intent when it is available" is contrary to the purpose of Batson to determine the
reason for the prosecutor's actions). Judge Stephen Reinhardt has provocatively suggested
that prosecutors who destroy their notes should bear the burden if they cannot explain
what they have done. See Shirley, 807 F.3d at 1106 n.16 ("Prosecutors who do not retain
notes from voir dire run the risk that, as here, they will not be able to produce
circumstantial evidence of their actual reasons for exercising a strike.").
195. As the Johnson Court explained:
The Batson framework is designed to produce actual answers to
suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury
selection process. The inherent uncertainty present in inquiries of dis-
criminatory purpose counsels against engaging in needless and imper-
fect speculation when a direct answer can be obtained by asking a simple
question.
545 U.S. at 172; see also Harris v. Hardy, 680 F.3d 942, 955 (7th Cir. 2012) ("The ASA's
testimony at the Batson hearing suggests that he was not reciting his recollection of his
reasons for the strike but rather was looking at the record and trying to come up with race-
neutral reasons to justify the strike."); Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 958 (9th Cir.
2010) (explaining reconstruction and providing examples of circumstantial evidence the
state may rely on); Dolphy v. Mantello, 552 F.3d 236, 240 (2d Cir. 2009) ("The district
court may, in its discretion, hold a hearing to reconstruct the prosecutor's state of mind at
the time of jury selection, and thereby determine whether the proffered race-neutral
explanation for the striking of the African-American juror was pretextual....").
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C. Difference in Judicial Approach to Trial and Appeal
A further division between trial and post-trial Batson can be found in
the growing importance of Batson procedural violations. While appellate
judges must defer to the factual and credibility findings of trial judges,
they have nonetheless found ways to identify procedural flaws in the way
the Batson inquiry was executed. These procedural violations allow the
appellate courts to engage with the Batson review in terms of legal ques-
tions, rather than factual questions, so deference to the trial court is not
required.
As commentators have noted, Batson claims involve many factual de-
terminations on which appellate courts must defer to the trial courts.196
Was the juror really slouched in her seat? Did the prosecutor appear
genuine in explaining herself at step two? Did the questioning of the
black jurors feel more aggressive than the questioning of white jurors?
The conventional wisdom is that appellate judges must show great defer-
ence on Batson claims because of all these credibility determinations.197
But appellate judges who see an injustice at trial and want to correct it
have found ways to reframe the factual questions as legal and procedural
ones.198 Significantly, on these legal, procedural questions, appellate
courts need not defer to the trial courts' decisions. Essentially, appellate
courts have found a way to avoid the deference they might otherwise owe
to their trial colleagues by identifying errors in the way the trial court
implemented Batson's procedures. While they might not be able to sec-
ond-guess trial courts' credibility decisions, appellate courts can insist
that the procedures for making these decisions be carried out correctly.
After all, if these procedures were improperly carried out, the courts
cannot be confident that the "real reasons" for the strikes were ever
discovered.
This point about procedural errors is not a small one. Procedural vi-
olations are particularly significant in Batson, as compared to in other
doctrines, because the Supreme Court has specifically decreed the three-
step framework courts must employ to produce the actual reasons for the
strikes.99 The question of whether the prosecutor had discriminatory
intent cannot be separated from the process used to ascertain those in-
tentions. Examples of these procedural violations include cases in which
the trial judge applied too demanding a threshold for the prima facie
196. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 697-98 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Since
the district court's determination of whether a peremptory challenge constituted pur-
poseful discrimination turns on an evaluation of credibility of the prosecutor's expla-
nation, we should give those findings great deference.").
198. See, e.g., Marder, Batson Revisited, supra note 37, at 1593 ("Of the eight cases
that were not affirmed, five cases involved unusual procedures by the trial judge, one case
was remanded for the prosecutor to give reasons, and two cases were before the Seventh
Circuit on collateral review and the law had changed since the earlier rulings.").
199. See supra note 195.
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case at step one,200 combined step two and step three into one,20 1 offered
her own suppositions about the reasons for the strikes before asking the
prosecutor,20 2 prevented relevant evidence from being presented,20 3 and
misallocated the burden of proof.2 4 Many Batson victories-including
remands for further fact-finding-involve these procedural violations.
Not surprisingly, these claims about Batson procedural violations are
largely confined to appeal. This is not to say that trial litigants are prohib-
ited from complaining about some procedural violation the court has
committed, but such complaints at trial would require the trial judge to
reverse herself, so they are more feasible to raise on appeal.
The development of "procedural" Batson violations is also related to
the intense postconviction pressures applied by AEDPA,2°5 a significant
impediment to federal habeas relief. Passed by Congress in 1996, AEDPA
prohibits federal courts from granting habeas relief to reverse a state con-
viction unless the state court's ruling on the legality of that conviction is
"contrary to... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States."2°o The term "clearly established
Federal law" has come to mean the holdings of Supreme Court cases-
not dicta, not logical extensions, not anything else.207 As a result of
AEDPA, federal courts cannot recognize a constitutional violation in any
state prisoner's case unless the state courts' decisions denying relief were
so egregiously wrong as to have transgressed a direct holding of the
Supreme Court.
200. See Johnson v. Finn, 665 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the
trial court improperly conflated the "strong likelihood" and "reasonable inference"
standards).
201. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995); United States v. McAllister, 693
F.3d 572, 581 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Rutledge, 648 F.3d 555, 559-60 (7th Cir.
2011); McCurdy v. Montgomery Cty., 240 F.3d 512, 521-22 (6th Cir. 2001); Addison v.
State, 962 N.E.2d 1202, 1210 (Ind. 2012).
202. E.g., Currie v. McDowell, 825 F.3d 603, 611 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding it "troubling
that [the prosecutor's] explanations for the strike were largely adopted from reasons the
trial judge had already suggested[] during his discussion of Batson step one"); see also
Shirley v. Yates, 807 F.3d 1090, 1107 (9th Cir. 2015) (faulting the district judge for
concluding, without seeking an actual answer, that it "could have been reasonable" for the
prosecutor to strike ajuror for lack of education).
203. E.g., Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 263 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding the trial
court "effectively omitted the third step of the Batson inquiry by unreasonably limiting the
defendant's opportunity to prove that the prosecutor's proffered reasons for striking Black
jurors were pretextual"); Hardcastle v. Horn, 368 F.3d 246, 251 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting the
trial court denied the prosecutor's request for permission to state her reasons for chal-
lenged strikes on the record).
204. E.g., United States v. Kimbrel, 532 F.3d 461, 467 (6th Cir. 2008).
205. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
titles of the U.S.C.).
206. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1) (2012).
207. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (O'Connor, J.); see also Howes v.
Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 505 (2012).
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Although AEDPA's "clearly established" limitation is a major hurdle
to federal habeas relief, this limitation does not apply equally to all types
of habeas claims. The doctrines it hits hardest are those that rely on
standards like "reasonableness" or on interest balancing.20 8 If the claim
asks the state court to appraise the gestalt of some issue, it is difficult to
show that the state court got it objectively and egregiously wrong.209 On
the other hand, with doctrines that are more rule-like-and especially
with those that have multiple, clearly defined steps-it is easier to show
that the state court misapplied Supreme Court law. Batson falls into this
latter category with its mandatory, three-step burden-shifting framework.
If the state court failed to follow any of Batson's three steps, the federal
court can point to the transgression of "clearly established Federal law"
as grounds for intervening.210 Moreover, Batson has the added benefit
that the three-part framework has been a core part of the doctrine from
the beginning, so there is no doubt that the law was clearly established at
the time of the state court decision-still another requirement of AEDPA.
21
1
Consider two caveats about these procedural Batson violations. First,
there are many Batson claims in which the appellate courts do end up
deferring to the decision of the trial judge without searching out some
procedural violation.212 In discussing procedural violations, this Article
describes how appellate judges who want to intervene have found ways to
do so in spite of the deference they might owe to the trial courts. This is
208. In Yarborough v. Alvarado, the Court explained that:
[T]he range of reasonable judgment can depend in part on the nature
of the relevant rule. If a legal rule is specific, the range may be narrow.
Applications of the rule may be plainly correct or incorrect. Other rules
are more general, and their meaning must emerge in application over
the course of time. Applying a general standard to a specific case can de-
mand a substantial element ofjudgment. As a result, evaluating whether
a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule's spec-
ificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reach-
ing outcomes in case-by-case determinations.
541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004).
209. For instance, the constitutional prohibition on shackling a defendant in front of
the jury requires the courts to make ajudgment call about whether "an essential state in-
terest" was served by the shackling. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69 (1986). For
an example in which the Court applied the AEDPA standard to a "general" test, see
Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664-65.
210. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
211. Williams v. Runnels, 432 F.3d 1102, 1105 n.5 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he Supreme
Court clearly indicates in Johnson that it is clarifying Batson, not making new law." (citing
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168-70 (2005))).
212. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.21 (1986) (explaining that the
trial judge's factual findings regarding discrimination should ordinarily be given "great
deference"); United States v. Barnette, 644 F.3d 192, 209, 213-14 (4th Cir. 2011)
(affirming the district court decision, even though the lower court conducted an in cam-
era review of prosecutors' notes, which is disfavored in Batson proceedings, and committed
harmless error in refusing to provide defendant with the unredactedjury questionnaires);
supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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not to suggest that all or most appellate judges take this route. Second,
this argument does not imply that Batson claims are somehow immune
from the limitations created by AEDPA. Many Batson claims are felled by
the "clearly established" bar, especially when the state court decided an
issue for which there is not a Supreme Court case directly on point.
213
This Article simply argues that, holding AEDPA's limitations constant
across all habeas doctrines, there are some advantages Batson enjoys be-
cause of its three-step, mechanical test. These advantages boost the use-
fulness of Batson claims relative to other habeas doctrines and raise the
stature of post-trial Batson relative to trial Batson.
III. IMPLICATIONS
A number of implications flow from Batson's special strength in ap-
pellate and habeas proceedings. These implications should affect the way
litigants plead Batson claims, judges decide those claims, and academic
commentators talk about Batson.
A. Batson as a Multipurpose Vehicle to Combat Discrimination
The point of discussing Batson relative to other antidiscrimination
doctrines is not just to burnish the doctrine's reputation. Rather, the
goal is to suggest how Batson can be deployed as a multipurpose antidis-
crimination doctrine capable of protecting against an array of racist acts,
even those outside jury selection. For example, in Foster v. Chatman, the
prosecutor employed overtly racist messaging in his closing argument. As
the cert petition noted, "The prosecutor... argued that the jury should
impose a death sentence to 'deter other people out there in the pro-
jects.' ' 214 Such a racist comment could be challenged on its own as a
form of prosecutorial misconduct, but the showing needed for such a
claim is difficult, and the misconduct claim is subject to harmless error
review.215 Batson, however, provides a more straightforward alternative
that is not subject to harmless error review. In other words, the racist
statement can be reconceptualized as proof of the prosecutor's discrimi-
natory intent injury selection.
Snyder v. Louisiana revealed a similar dynamic. The prosecutor re-
peatedly compared the black defendant to O.J. Simpson, despite de-
mands by the defendant and the trial court that he not make such a
213. See, e.g., McDaniels v. Kirkland, 813 F.3d 770, 775-76 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc)
(holding that, at time of state court decision, there was no clearly established federal law
requiring sua sponte comparative juror analysis).
214. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 151, at i.
215. See Means, Postconviction Remedies, supra note 56, § 46:18 ("[E]ven if a pro-
secutor's comments are inappropriate, they alone do not justify the reversal of a criminal
conviction obtained in an otherwise fair proceeding. Rather, the remarks must be ex-
amined within the context of the trial to determine whether the prosecutor's behavior
amounted to prejudicial error." (footnote omitted)).
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comparison.2 16 When the case reached the Supreme Court, several
Justices seized on the OJ. Simpson comparison as evidence of racism's
impact on the trial.217 Although the Court's decision in Snyder did not
mention OJ. Simpson, the racist prosecutorial statements seemed to be
on the Justices' minds as they considered the Batson claim.218 And with
good reason: The prosecutor's statements to the jury reveal his focus on
race at the time of trial and are thus relevant to understanding the moti-
vation behind his peremptory strikes.
The potential synergy between Batson and other antidiscrimination
doctrines is not limited to the prosecutorial-misconduct examples above.
Claims that the prosecutor's charging and sentencing decisions were ra-
cially motivated could also be reconceptualized as evidence of Batson vio-
lations, assuming of course that there were already some red flags to raise
questions about the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges. As noted
earlier, the difficulties are immense when it comes to pleading discrimi-
natory charging or discriminatory sentencing. But any of the evidence
that would support such a discriminatory-charging or -sentencing claim
could also show the prosecutor's racist intent atjury selection. For exam-
ple, in a case recently before the Supreme Court, the prosecutor revealed
in postconviction discovery that one of the reasons he sought the death
penalty against the defendant was that the defendant was not a citizen.219
This national-origin discrimination could support a Batson claim, and
putting this evidence of discrimination inside the Batson challenge could
give the claim greater legs because of Batson's appellate virtues.
This is not to say that a fake Batson label should be slapped onto
other antidiscrimination claims. Rather, the goal is to illustrate the true
capaciousness of Batson. The doctrine can accommodate any type of evi-
dence that speaks to the prosecutor's discriminatory intent, even evi-
dence that comes to light after the jury has been selected or after the
trial has concluded. By acknowledging the breadth of Batson, litigants
may find that evidence of discrimination-which could be pleaded as a
stand-alone claim of prosecutorial misconduct of some other sort-would
also, or better, fit within the Batson framework.
This more expansive view of Batson is also relevant to the oft-
suggested "solution" to Batson's shortcomings: the elimination of all per-
emptory strikes. Dating back to Justice Marshall's concurrence in Batson,
commentators have suggested that eliminating peremptory strikes
altogether is the only way to prevent them from being used in a discrim-
216. Brief of Petitioner at 2-3, Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) (No. 06-
10119), 2007 WL 2605447.
217. Transcript of Oral Argument at *37, Snyder, 552 U.S. 472 (No. 06-10119), 2007
WL 4252698.
218. See Snyder, 552 U.S. at 474-86.
219. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 17, Ayestas v. Davis, No. 16-6795, 2016 WL
8652345 (Nov. 7, 2016).
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inatory manner.22° Practitioners, even those concerned about racial
discrimination, often push back by pointing out that peremptory challenges
may be the only way defendants can free themselves ofjurors who harbor
racist (or antidefendant) biases.221 To this conversation, this Article adds
the consideration that eliminating peremptory strikes altogether would
also eliminate any value Batson may have as a multipurpose vehicle for
fighting discrimination.
To the extent that Batson sweeps in-or could sweep in-claims of
discrimination from anywhere in the trial, it would be a loss to defen-
dants and the justice system for Batson to disappear along with the elim-
ination of peremptory strikes. This is not to say that Batson's utility as a
multipurpose antidiscrimination vehicle justifies the continued use of
peremptory strikes. There are many factors to consider in that debate,
including the likelihood that eliminating peremptory strikes would result
in more aggressive racial discrimination in other parts of the jury-selec-
tion system, such as in the jury-summons process or the use of for-cause
challenges--doctrines even less equipped than Batson to resist it. But the
ongoing debate should consider the harm that would accrue from losing
Batson's ability to fight racial discrimination wherever it rears up in the
trial.
B. Appellate Batson's Symbolism, Rhetoric, and Power
In oral argument and in written decisions, appellate judges have
taken on a striking tone of moral outrage toward Batson violations.
222
Batson has come to be seen not simply as a doctrine that protects black
defendants from discrimination but rather as a doctrine that guarantees
the bedrock fairness of the judicial system for all litigants. Batson's de-
velopment into a guarantor of civic and democratic virtue has super-
charged the rhetoric and symbolism of the doctrine, but this transfor-
mation has occurred in ways that are far more accessible to appellate
judges than their trial colleagues, thus furthering the divide between
Batson's meaning during trial and its meaning after. Understanding the
nature of this schism is essential to appreciating Batson's potential as an
appellate doctrine.
As the Batson case law has developed over the years, it has trans-
formed from a doctrine that protected black defendants from the elimi-
nation of black jurors into a doctrine that now protects all parties-
defendant, prosecutor, and civil litigants-against the removal of jurors
for any of an expanding list of characteristics.223 Batson is nearly as much
about democracy and political community as it is about race. The fact
that Batson speaks in terms of democracy and the justice system's integrity
220. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
221. See supra section I.C.
222. See infra notes 225-230 and accompanying text.
223. See Karlan, Batson, supra note 57, at 406-07.
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makes it more politically powerful in taking on issues of racial discrimi-
nation. Batson violations have become assaults on the judiciary itself
because they undermine the fairness of the jury verdicts on which
everything else relies.
224
The outrage that Batson violations provoke goes beyond those char-
acteristics formally protected by the doctrine: race, gender, and national
origin. That is because there is something unseemly about manipulating
the jury-a body that is supposed to be representative of the popu-
lation-into a body that over- and underrepresents whole groups of
people.225 How many tweaks can be made to this civic institution before it
stops being representative at all? Such concerns go beyond Batson and
equal protection, yet they are part of what judges must wrestle with in
deciding Batson claims. Judges face these questions because prosecutors'
justifications for strikes often violate basic notions of how the justice sys-
tem ought to work, even if they do not violate Batson itself. At one oral
argument, the appellate panel appeared incensed by the trial prosecu-
tor's proffered reason that he struck a juror because she disagreed that
those brought to trial are probably guilty:
22 6
Judge Michael Daly Hawkins: Do you think it's appropriate
for a prosecutor, who's prosecuting a criminal case, to, in effect,
take the position that he prefers jurors who do not believe in
the presumption of innocence?
Deputy Attorney General: That particular question was not
actually asked, your honor.
Judge Hawkins: Well what was asked-he stated his
reason-one of his reasons was her response to the question, 'If
the prosecution brings someone to trial that person is probably
guilty,' and she checked, 'Disagree strongly.' I would hope every
American citizen would check the box that way.
22 7
224. See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez, 395 P.3d 186, 190 (Cal. 2017) ("Taints of discrim-
inatory bias in jury selection-actual or perceived-erode confidence in the adjudicative
process, undermining the public's trust in courts.... The error is structural, damaging the
integrity of the tribunal itself." (citations omitted)).
225. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) ("Jury service is an exercise of respon-
sible citizenship by all members of the community, including those who otherwise might
not have the opportunity to contribute to our civic life."); United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d
30, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting how Batson rights "extend 'to those citizens who desire to
participate "in the administration of the law, as jurors," as well as to ... eradicating
discrimination from our civic institutions [that] suffers whenever an individual is ex-
cluded ... on account of his race' or other suspect characteristic" (quoting Johnson v.
California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005))), aff'd in part sub nom. Smith v. United States, 568
U.S. 106 (2013).
226. Oral Argument at 16:00, Williams v. Pliler, 616 F. App'x 864 (9th Cir. 2015) (No.
14-16393), http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view.php?pk-id=0000006645 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
227. Id.; see also Williams, 616 F. App'x at 870 (finding a Batson violation when ajuror
was struck because of her "agreement with the presumption of innocence that is basic to
our criminal justice system, not any specific bias against the prosecution"); United States v.
Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 1005 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("A strike based
[Vol. 118:713
BATSON 'S APPELLATE APPEAL
Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt has taken issue with striking
jurors because they did not go to college, especially because of the disparate
impact along racial lines: "Does it bother you that a prosecutor would say
people who didn't go to college shouldn't be on juries?" he asked a
prosecutor in one argument.22 8 A thought-provoking, if obscure, example
of Batson's penumbra comes from a county court in New York, where a
reviewing court found a "Batson-like" violation because all licensed hun-
ters had been struck from the jury.229 Striking someone for believing in
the presumption of innocence or for lacking a college education is not a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, but it is nonetheless offensive.
230
At a time of enormous divisions and partisanship in American society, it
is troubling to think about allowing the bedrock civic institution of the
jury to be further splintered. One wonders, for example, whether the
jury could function as a civic institution if a prosecutor set out to cleanse
it of all registered Democrats or everyone receiving public assistance. The
civic and philosophical issues raised by Batson are inherently tied up in
the way the doctrine is litigated, and they have created an exoskeleton of
symbolism on top of Batson's equal protection bones.
Significantly, for purposes of this Article, Batson's symbolism pro-
vides appellate judges with an unrivaled opportunity to declaim on the
structural issues facing the court system. And these judges have the op-
portunity to make such pronouncements in the context of a structural
error claim-an unusual context that means they are actually empowered
to grant relief to the defendant. Their pronouncements on race are given
all that much more weight because they are accompanied by the act of
throwing out a conviction. And pronounce they have. Appellate decisions
solely on a juror's participation... in a prior acquittal... threatens the institution of the
jury... [but] nonetheless urvives the de minimis burden placed on the prosecution at the
second [step] of the Batson analysis."); Moran v. Clarke, 443 F.3d 646, 661 (8th Cir. 2006)
(Beam, J., dissenting) ("Justice Thurgood Marshall in his eloquent Batson concurrence
stated 'Our criminal justice system requires not only freedom from any bias against the
accused, but also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and the state
the scales are to be evenly held.'" (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107 (1986)
(Marshall, J., dissenting))); Oral Argument at 11:06, Allen v. Benedetti, 629 Fed. App'x
814 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-16671), http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view.php?pk_
id=0000014900 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (including the deputy attorney gen-
eral's observation of the trial judge's comment that "I've never heard somebody striking
somebody as a teacher").
228. Oral Argument at 28:11, Shirley v. Yates, 807 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-
16273), http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view-video.php?pk_vid=00000067 70 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review). But see Grossman, supra note 40, at 9 (discussing "[v]iews
on the legal system" as grounds for satisfactory step two answers).
229. People v. Robar, 29 Misc. 3d 693, 698-99 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 2010) ("This court is not
yet ready to find.., that licensed hunters are a... protected class distinct under Batson/
Luciano, but this court... [finds] they are a class governed by the Civil Rights Clause,
which guarantees the right... for a defendant to be tried by ajury of his peers.").
230. In the context of the oral arguments described above, the judges' concerns




about Batson warn of nothing less than the demise of "multiracial de-
mocracy" and the "proud" idea of the "melting pot" if Batson's rules are
not enforced.231 Batson is uniquely suited to these proclamations about
civics and fairness because it is seen as a protector of the whole system,
notjust the fairness of the particular trial.
23 2
This system-wide perspective is an aspect of Batson that appellate,
more than trial, judges have access to. Appellate decisions are reasoned
and crafted in a manner that is fundamentally different from the deci-
sions of trial courts, which helps account for appellate Batson's unusual
power. In general, appellate decisions are longer, more philosophical,
and more far-reaching than trial court decisions. The existence of con-
currences and dissents allows judges to stray further from the specific
facts of the case and into the broader principles that govern-or ought to
govern-the case. Moreover, appellate decisions are binding on future
cases and, as a result, are capable of bringing forth systemic changes that
go far beyond the individual case.
Trial judges, on the other hand, are generally not in a position to
engage with Batson on these high-flying terms. Trial courts do not have
the time or the platform to pronounce on Batson's implications for civics
and race; their Batson decisions are typically oral rulings from the bench,
and even when they are written, they are unlikely to be published in any
official reporter.233 Nor are they precedential. These factors mean trial
231. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630-31 (1991) ("If our society
is to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize that the automatic
invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress and causes continued hurt and
injury."); People v. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 346 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Our jury venires
daily include Cubans named O'Rourke, Indonesians named Opdyke, and Anglos named
Gomes.... The country is a melting pot-and proud of it-and.., the great folly of ste-
reotyping is that nowhere on earth have race and ethnicity become harder to determine
than they are here."); see also State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 329 (Wash. 2013) (en
banc) ("This appeal raises important questions about race discrimination in our criminal
justice system."), abrogated by City of Seattle v. Erickson, No. 93408-8, 2017 WL 2876250
(Wash.July 6, 2017).
232. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 141-42 (1994) ("All [potential jurors] ...
have the right not to be excluded summarily because of discriminatory and stereotypical
presumptions .... Striking individual jurors on the assumption that they hold particular
views simply because of their gender is 'practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law,
an assertion of their inferiority."' (footnote omitted) (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880))); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 485
(9th Cir. 2014) ("Strikes exercised on the basis of sexual orientation continue this deplor-
able tradition of treating gays and lesbians as undeserving of participation in our nation's
most cherished rites and rituals. They [indicate] . . . our judicial system treats gays and
lesbians differently[,] ... depriv[ing] individuals of the opportunity to participate in per-
fecting democracy....").
233. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies, supra note 51, at 2022 (noting that "virtually
no Batson decisions at the trial court level are reported"). But see McKinney v. Artuz, 326
F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting the trial judge's suggestion that "it's high time the
Court of Appeals follows the wisdom of Thurgood Marshal [1] and decides all peremptory
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judges have less incentive to make the big pronouncements that their
appellate colleagues do.
Granted, of course, there are many appellate Batson decisions that
are quite mundane, devoid of anything approaching political or moral
philosophy.234 And, at the same time, there are some Batson trial decisions
that declaim on big issues.235 But the point stands that there is an
underlying structural difference in the way Batson claims present them-
selves to appellate judges compared to trial judges.
Appellate courts may also treat Batson claims differently from their
trial colleagues because of their distance in space and time from the
Batson violations. At trial, as noted earlier, the Batson inquiry is intensely
personal.2 6 A defense attorney who wants to challenge a strike must ar-
gue that it was motivated by discriminatory intent, and the trial judge
must decide the issue on the spot. On appeal, however, the social awk-
wardness of the Batson inquiry is lessened: The litigation is done mostly
on paper rather than in person; years or even decades may have passed
so the trial prosecutor may no longer be part of the case; and even if the
prosecutor is part of the case, the appellate judges are less likely to be
familiar with any of the lawyers.237 The appellate deliberative process is
slow and secluded, with groups of judges deciding cases behind closed
doors rather than a single judge making decisions in the heat of the
moment. That is the difference in space.
The difference in time is significant, too, especially in old capital
cases that slowly move through the appellate and habeas pipelines. Judges
today may be more sensitive to, and aware of, racial discrimination than
judges were ten or twenty years ago. (At least, one hopes.) As a result, an
appellate court in 2018 considering whether Batson was violated may be
applying contemporary understandings of race to a strike that took place
in the late 1980s or early 1990s.23 Significantly, Batson asks judges to
determine whether the prosecutor's strike was motivated by race, full
stop. It is not a question of whether the decision would have been
challenges are intrinsically prejudicial and should be eliminated as an archaic tool for
more racist times" (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
234. See, e.g., United States v. Platt, 608 F. App'x 22, 25 (2d Cir. 2015); United States
v. Carter, 483 F. App'x 70, 74 (6th Cir. 2012).
235. See State v. Evans, 998 P.2d 373, 377 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting the trial
judge's language about "protect[ing] the right ofjurors to participate in the civic process
and... ensur[ing] that our justice system is free from any taint of racial bias").
236. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
237. There are a variety of reasons that the trial attorney may not be the one handling
the appeal. It could be because the trial attorney has retired, or because there is a division
of labor in her office that assigns appeals to a special unit, or because the appeal is han-
dled by an entirely different agency, such as the state attorney general. See supra note 139
and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747 (2016) (reviewing a Batson
claim twenty-nine years from the time of trial); Madison v. Comm'r, 761 F.3d 1240, 1244
(11th Cir. 2014) (reviewing a Batson claim nineteen years from the time of voir dire).
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considered racist at the time. That means appellate judges apply their
own contemporary understandings of racism to cases from a different
era.13 9 To the extent that society's understanding of racism has grown
more sophisticated over time, an appellate judge looking back at the trial
from today's vantage point might be more inclined to see racial intent
than the trial judge was at the time.
To be sure, there are countervailing forces that make it is easier for
trial judges, rather than appellate judges, to find Batson violations, not
least of which is the trial judge's firsthand view of what transpired in
court. Batson, after all, affords "great deference" to the trial judge's cred-
ibility determinations.24 This does not diminish the argument about
Batson's unique post-trial virtues. The point is not the relative likelihood
of winning a Batson claim at trial versus on appeal. Rather, the point is
that post-trial Batson provides unappreciated opportunities that trial Batson
does not.
C. The Gap Between the Trial and Appellate Doctrine Is a Feature, Not a
Flaw, of Batson.
If there is a divergence between trial and post-trial Batson, the temp-
tation is to find a way to reconcile the two sides of the doctrine. The
trouble is that it is not possible to reconcile the two halves of the doctrine
without undermining key tenets of Batson. The following section de-
scribes why the gap between trial and post-trial Batson will persist and why
it is preferable to imposing an artificial symmetry on the two halves of
Batson.
1. Evidence: Leveling Up and Leveling Down. - First, consider the gap
between the evidence that can be used at trial and the evidence that can
be used later on. In other areas of the law, the type of evidence and ar-
guments that can be used post-trial are dictated by what was available at
trial. Batson postconviction litigation could be made like Brady v.
Maryland or Strickland v. Washington, which limit new evidence to material
that could have been obtained at trial, if only the prosecutor had not
failed to disclose it or defense counsel had not failed to uncover it.24'
There is a certain logic to this limitation, because it avoids having a claim
at trial that cannot be fully proven until the postconviction proceed-
239. People v. Gutierrez, 395 P.3d 186, 207 (Cal. 2017) (Liu, J., concurring) ("Foster
and Miller-El involved trials that took place over 30 years ago. I would surmise and hope,
though I do not know for sure, that such brazenly unlawful practices are rare today."
(citations omitted)); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1985) (noting how con-
fidence in the justice system suffers when there is discriminatoryjury selection).
240. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21.
241. See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 419 (1995) ("[C]onstitutional error results.., if there is a 'reasonable prob-
ability' that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.").
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ings.24 2 However, the trouble with a Brady- or Strickland-style rule for
Batson evidence is that it would bar late-arising evidence that may speak
directly to the prosecutor's intent but was not in existence at the time of
trial or may have been legally privileged. Examples include racist state-
ments made by the prosecutor in or outside court, Batson violations charged
to the prosecutor in cases that were decided after the defendant's trial,
and jury-selection notes that were deemed privileged from disclosure at
trial but became available later on.24" Leveling down might also prevent
the use of comparative juror analysis on appeal, if some important
element of it could not have been carried out at trial-even though com-
parative juror analysis is effectively required of Batson litigants on appeal.
This leveling down of post-trial Batson would force courts to blind
themselves to evidence of the prosecutor's discriminatory intent, and this
blindness would directly conflict with Batson's goal of determining the
actual reason behind the strike. As the Supreme Court explained in
Foster v. Chatman: "We have 'made it clear that in considering a Batson
objection, or in reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the
circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be con-
sulted.'"24 It bears repeating that the question Batson poses is not whether
the trial court made the right decision in light of the evidence available
to it at the time of trial. Rather, the question Batson poses is whether the
prosecutor's strike was motivated by race-that is the importance of the
Supreme Court's insistence on the search for "actual answers."245 A lim-
itation on late-arising evidence would flout that mandate.
This is not to say that Batson ushers all relevant evidence into state
and federal habeas proceedings, much less direct appeals. Each of these
242. This leveling down would be in line with concerns that Justice Clarence Thomas
has raised in several Batson decisions: "We have no business overturning a conviction, years
after the fact and after extensive intervening litigation, based on arguments not presented
to the courts below." Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 489 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 284 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Without
the questionnaires never submitted to the trial court, Miller-El comes nowhere near
establishing that race motivated any disparate questioning or treatment, which is precisely
why the majority must strain to include the questionnaires within the state-court record.").
Justice Thomas was speaking about the deference that federal courts must show to state
courts under AEDPA, but the same principle would apply even if the appellate and trial
courts were both state or both federal.
243. See supra section II.B.1-.3.
244. Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1748 (2016) (quoting Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478);
see also Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005) (emphasizing that "[w] hat matters
is the real reason they were stricken" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Paulino
v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2004))).
245. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171; see also People v. Chism, 324 P.3d 183, 244 (Cal. 2014)
(Liu, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[A]ppellate review of a Batson ruling
is not merely an exercise in evaluating the trial court's performance based on arguments
put forth by the parties. Instead[,] ... Snyder and Miller-El require appellate courts to con-




procedural postures-direct appeal, state habeas, and federal habeas-
has its own procedural rules governing what new evidence can be brought
into the case, and these apply to all claims, including Batson.2 46 The point
is that holding these evidentiary limitations constant, Batson has a
broader sweep than other record-expanding doctrines because it is not
focused on whether the evidence could have been available at trial. What
makes evidence relevant to Batson is its ability to speak to the intent of
the prosecutor. Perhaps ironically, it is this focus on the prosecutor's in-
tent-a much-bemoaned aspect of the Batson inquiry-that sweeps so
much evidence into post-trial Batson claims.
If it would not work to level down Batson's post-trial use of evidence,
what about leveling up the trial doctrine's use of it? One could decree
that trial litigants must have access to anything that will (or could) even-
tually be part of the habeas case. Perhaps that decree would succeed in
giving trial attorneys access to materials such as jury-selection notes or
internal memoranda, which exist at the time of trial but are often con-
sidered legally privileged. But aside from this category of materials, level-
ing up trial Batson (obviously) could not produce evidence at trial that
has not yet come into existence-for example, the prosecutor's racist
statements in subsequent cases or examples of Batson violations from
cases that come after the defendant's trial. So, leveling up could not on
its own close the gap.
2. Remedy: Leveling Up and Leveling Down. - Nor is there much to
be done to reconcile the value of the trial and post-trial remedies. That is
true because going back to the beginning ofjury selection is simply more
significant on appeal and habeas than at trial. The only way to make a
trial Batson win as valuable as a post-trial win is to alter the remedy, and
that would involve an overhaul of settled Batson law. The trial remedy
could be leveled up, it is true. For example, Professor Charles Ogletree
has proposed that Batson violations could result in dismissal of the charg-
es with prejudice against refiling them.247 This would certainly raise the
significance of Batson's trial remedy, likely beyond even the appellate and
post-trial remedies. It would mean that once a Batson violation was de-
clared, the defendant could never be prosecuted for that crime. But such
an innovation would require a sea change in the doctrine and would
probably not be politically possible.
246. The most prominent of these in federal habeas review of state convictions is
Cullen v. Pinholster, which limits a federal court's review of the conviction to the evidence
that was before the state courts as they evaluated the conviction. 563 U.S. 170, 181-82
(2011). State habeas proceedings are more permissive in allowing for an expansion of the
record, but they nonetheless have their own limitations on what new evidence can come
into the case. See Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Missing the Forest for the Trees: Federal
Habeas Corpus and the Piecemeal Problem in Actual Innocence Cases, 10 Stan. J. C.R. &
C.L. 55, 63 (2014). In a direct appeal, there is a strong presumption against introducing
any evidence not in the record. Id. at 59-60.
247. Ogletree, supra note 16, at 1117.
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Leveling down the appellate remedy would also close the gap. Such
leveling down could be accomplished by declaring that Batson violations
are not structural error and, thus, must have prejudiced the defendant in
order to justify a reversal. Forcing a defendant to show prejudice would
greatly reduce the significance of an appellate Batson win, but it would
mire the doctrine in the impossible question of demonstrating that the
presence or absence of any particular juror affected the outcome. In-
deed, one of the reasons Batson must be a structural error is that there is
no feasible way to detect or calculate the prejudice that accrues from the
taint to the jury.24 Because automatic reversal is a foundational aspect of
Batson, it seems exceedingly unlikely it could be eliminated in some
effort to reconcile trial and post-trial Batson.
3. Broader Reflections on the Trial-Post-Trial Gaps. - The discomfort
about allowing appellate Batson to outpace trial Batson is understandable.
It upends the typical logic of the appellate system to have a claim that
cannot be fully decided by the trial judge and, instead, ripens on appeal
or habeas. Judges and prosecutors may naturally worry that even if the
Batson objections are resolved at trial, the objections could arise with new
force on appeal, endangering hard-earned convictions and injecting an
air of unpredictability into every conviction. But the U.S. Supreme Court
requires comparative juror analysis, even for the first time on appeal. As
has been emphasized throughout, Batson is an absolutist doctrine fo-
cused on the question of the prosecutor's intent, not the question of how
his intent would have been perceived at trial. If comparative juror analy-
sis or some other late-arising evidentiary material speaks to that question,
it is not for Batson to ignore that evidence just because it was not present-
ed at trial.
2 49
248. See Review Proceedings, 37 Geo. LJ. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 805, 849 n.2554
(2008). As noted earlier, a few state court opinions have required showings of prejudice.
See Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies, supra note 51, at 2019 n.87. Batson prejudice also
arises in the context of claims that assert counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing
to raise a Batson objection at trial. Strickland v. Washington requires a showing of deficient
performance of counsel and a resulting prejudice to the defendant. 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984). Some courts have required a showing not only that the Batson objection would
have succeeded but also that the defendant had a reasonable probability of a different
outcome at the retrial. Other courts are willing to find the Strickland prejudice require-
ment satisfied by the grant of a new trial. See Amy Knight Burns, Note, Insurmountable
Obstacles: Structural Errors, Procedural Default, and Ineffective Assistance, 64 Stan. L.
Rev. 727, 747-48 (2012).
249. As Justice Liu wrote in Chism, 324 P.3d at 244 (Liu, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part):
[Alppellate review of a Batson ruling is not merely an exercise in
evaluating the trial court's performance based on arguments put forth
by the parties.... [A]n appellate court is not precluded from con-
sidering, and indeed must consider, grounds that the defendant did not
bring to the trial court's attention.... [T]here is no reason why jurors
seated after a trial court's ruling may be considered only if the defen-
dant makes a renewed objection.
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Nor is this late-arising potential bad from a policy perspective. A
prosecutor who is worried that today's conviction could be undermined
by tomorrow's Batson appeal is not powerless. The surest way to avoid a
Batson challenge in the first place is to accept the jury as-is, without exer-
cising peremptory strikes. Short of that, a prosecutor who uses her strikes
parsimoniously, and who voluntarily articulates the basis for the strikes,
could do a lot to foreclose future Batson claims. It would be a good outcome
if prosecutors were more circumspect about using their peremptories. It
would be a welcome side effect of the trial-post-trial divergence if pro-
secutorial behavior at trial were at least somewhat deterred by the un-
certainty about future Batson litigation.
Finally, it is worth noting that there are other doctrines in which tri-
al and post-trial practice dramatically diverge. A claim ofjudicial bias, for
example, faces long odds at trial. The more biased the judge, the more
likely the judge would reject the claim. But on appeal it could win. The
denial of a public trial, another structural error, would be more likely to
succeed on appeal than at trial. That is true not only because the judge
who improperly closed the hearing would seem less likely to grant the
public-trial objection but also because the public-trial right serves a pur-
pose that is larger than the particular trial-preserving the public confi-
dence in the integrity of the judiciary-and might thus have more
purchase for appellate judges who must consider a wider range of cases.
Juror-misconduct claims also fit within the trial-post-trial rubric, as the
evidence needed to win on a juror-misconduct claim usually becomes
available only when the record is expanded in postconviction litigation.
2 50
What makes Batson stand out from the examples above is the duality
between trial and post-trial proceedings. Batson can be raised at trial us-
ing only the evidence on the record and then it can be raised in a very
different way post-trial with the extra-record evidence. This postconvic-
tion pivot distinguishes Batson from the claims discussed above, which
can be alleged in only the most skeletal form at trial and must wait for
record-expansion to be alleged in earnest. This pivot is a testament o the
fact that Batson did not fully eclipse its extra-record-only predecessor,
Swain; it just provided an easier route to get to the same place. Litigants
can use a record-based Batson claim to preserve the issue for appellate
and postconviction litigation, and then supplement that objection with
later-acquired extra-record evidence that speaks to the prosecutor's actu-
al intent. And the courts must consider this additional evidence because
the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence has explicitly set the
focus on the prosecutor's actual intent.
A related concern is that these new Batson claims impose costs on the appellate system,
even when they are not successful, because they still have to be adjudicated. But that is a
complaint about postconviction litigation more generally, not about Batson.
250. Misconduct allegations can conceivably be brought at trial, if the misconduct is
detected.
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CONCLUSION
Batson has received significant and sustained criticism for what it fails
to do. And while there is much that the critics get right about Batson, the
criticism has failed to distinguish between the trial and post-trial sides of
the doctrine. Unlike other criminal procedure doctrines, Batson plays out
very differently on appeal than at trial. And, as this Article has shown,
appellate Batson provides a number of opportunities for litigants and
courts to address the stain of racial discrimination in ways that were not
possible at trial. This Article is not an apology for Batson or an attempt to
say that the doctrine is functioning fine. Rather, it aims to show Batson in
a different light from the standard trial-focused critique. And it attempts
to call attention to Batson's strengths relative to other antidiscrimination
doctrines.
Batson holds great potential to address the harm caused by racial
discrimination in the justice system. Because it protects all litigants-
criminal defendants, prosecutors, and civil litigants-and because it ul-
timately protects jurors and the judicial system itself, it has survived intact
over the years, even as courts have cast other antidiscrimination doctrines
aside. One of the abiding ironies this Article discusses is that evidence of
systemic racism can be used to prove a Batson violation, but the violation
only necessarily implies a single act of wrongdoing. The doctrine is thus
more palatable to the judiciary than fair cross-section, discriminatory-
charging, and other claims that imply widespread discrimination. Perhaps
in this unusual brew of universalism, third-party standing, and systemic-
but-one-off jurisprudence, there is a model for other antidiscrimination
doctrines.
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